

LIBRARY  
JUN 27 1921  
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK

# THE ANNALIST

A Magazine of Finance, Commerce and Economics


Vol. 17, No. 441

NEW YORK, MONDAY, JUNE 27, 1921

Ten Cents

## Chief Contents

	Page		Page
What Is the Matter With Wall Street? .....	683	Bank Clearings .....	691
The Legislative Week in Washington .....	684	New York Stock Exchange Transactions .....	692
The United States and the Gold Standard .....	685	Trend of Bond Prices .....	696
What Is to Be the Future Price Level? .....	686	Week's Curb Transactions .....	697
Rewards of Wartime Development Not Unmixed .....	688	Open Security Market .....	698
Barometrics .....	690	Dividends Declared and Awaiting Payments .....	699
Federal Reserve Banking Statistics .....	691	The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions .....	702
		Transactions on Out - of - Town Markets .....	703



The black line shows the closing average price of fifty stocks, half industrials and half railroads. The black area shows for each week the highest and lowest daily average price of the twenty-five industrials, and the white area the corresponding figures for twenty-five rails.



ADVERTISEMENT.

ADVERTISEMENT.

NEW ISSUE

# \$3,000,000

## STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

### Real Estate Series 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ % Sinking Fund Gold Bonds

Dated July 1, 1921

Due July 1, 1931, 1936, 1941, 1946 and 1948

**Exempt from Federal Income Tax, Including Surtax, and from all Taxes in North Dakota. Legal Investment for Trust Funds and Savings Banks in New York and most other States**

**PURPOSE OF ISSUE:** The purpose of this issue is to stimulate agriculture by advancing to farmers additional capital secured by first mortgages on their improved farms.

**AUTHORITY AND VALIDITY:** This bond issue is authorized by Chapter 154, of the laws of North Dakota, 1919. The constitutionality of the law authorizing the bonds has been passed upon and approved by the District Court, by the Supreme Court of North Dakota, by the United States Federal District Court, and by the Supreme Court of the United States in a unanimous decision. Copy of this decision will be furnished by the undersigned.

**SECURITY:** Bonds of this issue constitute a full credit obligation and are backed by the entire resources of the State, amounting to \$3,000,000,000. The State of North Dakota embraces 70,000 square miles, with 17,000,000 acres under cultivation. Including this issue, its debt amounts to less than one-half of one per cent. of the assessed valuation. A sinking fund for the payment of interest and retirement of bonds as due is provided for by a direct tax on all real estate and personal property. This fund is to be held by the State Treasurer subject to the usual safety provisions.

In addition to placing behind the bonds the credit of the entire State, its full taxing power and its total resources, first mortgages on improved North Dakota farm lands have been filed with the Treasurer of the State as direct security for the bonds. There is a \$100 mortgage for every \$100 Bond. The mortgages represent approximately 40% of the valuation of the land and in no case can this valuation be more than 50% which is the ratio by statute. These mortgages are on farms under cultivation and the interest is now being paid to the State of North Dakota. As a consequence, an interest fund has already been created. The interest and amortization payments on the mortgage are sufficient to meet the interest payments on the bonds and to retire them at maturity.

Legal opinion by Messrs. Wood & Oakley, Chicago, Ill.

**Price 100 and interest, to yield 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ %**

We invite the closest investigation of this issue by the most conservative bond buyers.  
Write or call for booklet containing full description.  
Make all drafts and checks payable to the Bank of North Dakota.

## The State of North Dakota

Bond Sales Office,  
3061 Equitable Bldg., New York  
Telephone Rector 4425

Fiscal Agent,  
The Bank of North Dakota  
Bismarck, N. D.

Bond Sales Office,  
1059 Peoples Gas Bldg.,  
Chicago, Ill.  
Telephone Harrison 8639

**DEVOTED SOLELY TO THE NEWS  
ABOUT BANKS AND BANKERS**

## The American Banker

is able to give the  
complete news of its field

You may find the item that will interest you particularly, in another publication, but YOU WILL surely find it in

## The American Banker

The oldest and most widely circulated  
Banking Journal in America.

Subscription  
\$5.00 per year

67 Pearl Street,  
New York, N. Y.

## The Annalist Binder

To keep intact issues of The Annalist and make them more easily available for reference, a durable binder made of strong cloth with gilt lettering may be obtained for \$1.50. It holds twenty-six issues.

**THE ANNALIST**  
Times Square—New York

## WESTERN CANADA

is recognized as a wonderful  
field for investment.

If you wish to keep in touch  
with its development read the  
financial paper of the West.

**CANADIAN FINANCE**  
Published at Winnipeg

\$2.50 per annum.

## Water Power Developments

Investigations Designs Appraisals

**CHARLES B. HAWLEY**

Consulting Engineer

Munsey Building Washington, D. C.

Blank Books, Bound and Loose-Leaf;  
Printing, Lithographing, En-  
graving; Office Stationery  
and Supplies.  
**WILLIAM MANN COMPANY**  
Philadelphia  
Founded in 1848  
New York Office: 281 Broadway.

## DIVIDENDS.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC CO.**

COMMON STOCK DIVIDEND NO. 22.

The regular quarterly dividend of \$1.25 per share upon the Common Capital Stock of this Company will be paid on July 15, 1921, to shareholders of record at close of business June 30, 1921. The transfer books will not be closed and checks will be mailed from the office of the Company in time to reach stockholders on the date they are payable.

A. F. HOCKENBEAMER,  
Vice-President and Treasurer.  
San Francisco, California.

**UNITED STATES REALTY &  
IMPROVEMENT COMPANY**  
111 Broadway, New York.

June 27, 1921.  
The coupons of this Company's Twenty-year Debenture 5% Bonds, due on January 1st next, will be paid on July 1st, upon presentation at the Company's office, 1115 Trinity Building.

ALBERT E. HADLOCK, Treasurer.  
The regular quarterly dividend of 1 $\frac{3}{4}$ % will be paid July 1st to preferred stockholders of record June 29th.

**THE GENERAL TIRE AND RUBBER CO.,**  
Akron, Ohio.

## AMERICAN LOCOMOTIVE

Brilliant financial position.  
Ready for business revival.  
Analyzed and discussed in.

Ask for a  
copy G-103

**MARKET  
OPINION**

**R. H. MACMASTERS & CO.**

Members Consolidated Stock Exchange of N. Y.

82-84 Broad St. New York

Phone: Broad 0380. Entire First Floor

Offices in eight cities - direct wires

## LIQUIDATION NOTICE.

The National Bank of Visalia, located at Visalia, in the State of California, is closing its affairs. All note holders and other creditors of the association are therefore hereby notified to present the notes and other claims for payment.

Dated Visalia, California, June 4, 1921.  
C. J. GIDDINGS, President.

## THE McGOVERN METHOD

The McGovern method of physical upbuilding is practised exclusively at the McGovern Gymnasium under the personal supervision of Mr. McGovern.

No other Gymnasium is qualified to successfully practise this widely endorsed system.

**McGovern's Gymnasium**

Durand's Riding Academy,  
5 West 66th St., N. Y. C.

Tel. Columbus 2928-10134-9100



## Offices

Telephone, Bryant 1000  
Times Building.....Times Square  
Times Annex.....229 West 43d St.  
Downtown.....7 Beekman St.  
Wall Street.....2 Rector St.  
Harlem.....111 West 125th Street  
Brooklyn.....300 Washington St.  
Washington.....Albee Building  
Chicago.....1302-1304 Tribune Building  
Detroit.....701 Ford Building  
St. Louis.....613 Globe-Dem. Building  
San Francisco.....742 Market St.  
London.....12 Salisbury Square, E. C.  
Paris.....Au Matin, 6 Boulevard Poissonniere

# THE ANNALIST

## A Magazine of Finance, Commerce and Economics

Published Every Monday Morning by The New York Times Company, Times Square, New York

## Subscription Rates

Three Six One  
Mos.Mos.Year.  
In United States, Mexico,  
and United States tribu-  
taries .....\$1.25 \$2.50 \$5.00  
Canada (postpaid).....1.40 2.75 5.50  
Other countries (postpaid) 1.50 3.00 6.00  
Single Copies, 10 Cents  
Binder for 26 issues, \$1.50  
Entered as second-class matter March  
21, 1914, at the Post Office at New  
York, N. Y., under the Act  
of March 3, 1879

Vol. 17, No. 441

NEW YORK, MONDAY, JUNE 27, 1921

Ten Cents

# What Is the Matter With Wall Street?

By Franklin K. Sprague

**T**HE heavy decline which has been taking place in the stock market for the last three to four weeks has been a distinct surprise, not alone to the public, but to the banking fraternity as well. This has come to pass, not because values were already low, and declines which were registered appeared to disregard intrinsic worth, but because in the final analysis, in the stock market, no matter what may be the day-to-day fluctuations, the major cycles of movement are construed to be an index to the future; a forecast of business trends, say, six months hence. Therefore, it was discouraging to find that the course of stock market prices was toward lower levels at a time when there was beginning to be felt in certain avenues of trade, that the signs of improvement were apparent; that in the course of some six months, with the process of readjustment having been completed, business would return, at least to a partial realization of that prosperity which was evident a year ago.

What then, are the inferences to be drawn from this rapid decline in the value of securities? Judging events of the moment as to their true value is always a difficult undertaking, and possibly the perspective is lacking now to determine accurately just what the rapid falling off in stock market quotations means. However, certain facts of the decline stand out clearly. It might well be said, perhaps, that the market in its course of the last few weeks, has been evidencing, not a basis upon which to judge the future, but a disconsolate aftermath of the past. While the period of readjustment was at its height there was much talk of impairment of inventories, the prospective passing of dividends, and losses such as would wipe out, to a large degree, perhaps, much of the profit which had accrued to companies in the period of inflation. But the discussion then was academic; the facts to prove the contention were lacking. Wall Street knew that the arguments as to losses and decreased earnings was logical, but it was prone to shut its eyes to the situation in considering stock market values. This came about, undoubtedly, because of the heavy depreciation in security values, during the latter part of last year, and especially in December. A drop, for instance, from \$300 to \$150, such as was portrayed in the case of one stock, might be said to have discounted very much that was unfavorable. It did discount, in part, to be sure, and, perhaps, in the light of future events it will be found that the drop was sufficient to wipe out all of the inflation in the issue.

In the last three weeks, however, Wall Street has been undergoing a series of depressing influences. It may be that they are magnified; probably they have been, for that is always Wall Street's way. In any event, the factors are themselves ap-

parent, and that they have been disturbing is plainly evident in the course of prices. To discuss decreased earnings and impaired dividends, as of the future, is quite another thing than having tangible evidence of the decreased earnings in the actual passing of the dividends. Then, it is this gauntlet of dividend changes, on the downward side, that Wall Street has been passing through, in the last several weeks. It has been clearly shown that in the process of deflation and the building up of the value of the dollar to something approximating its true pre-war worth in purchasing power, the industrial companies were obliged to

see a heavy shrinkage in the earnings which came to them as a result of inflation.

Too frequently, the stock market decline is attributed to professional short selling. It may be open to argument just how much of a factor the short interest is as a support to the market through covering operations in a period such as that which has just passed, but however that may be, the fact remains that no such decline as has taken place—no such volume of business as has been turned over—could have been a product of short selling alone. In the process of going short of the market, of course the

objective is to bring about the liquidation of long stock so that "covering" may be undertaken at a profit. Should this long stock fail to come on the market, the situation as to the short seller would be simply that of striking a balance on prices when the covering was undertaken. In the last three weeks there is no getting away from the fact that there has been heavy liquidation of securities, not by the public, as that term generally is used in stock market parlance, but by some big holders of securities who have found it not to their advantage to fight longer against the trend. The character of this selling, however, is somewhat complex, because of the fact that it is difficult to differentiate between the real short sale and the short sale which is in effect a sale of long stock with the books remaining open. By this operation the holder of the securities is assured against further loss, since he can at any time deliver his "long" stock against the "short" sale and have actually effected a sale at a price possibly several points higher than the market of the moment.

**B**UT this is only one angle. Coupled with the decline have been rumors of a most disturbing sort. Some of them have developed to be true. Others have been proved false, and still others hang over the market as an ominous cloud. But it must be said that the percentage of truth, as compared to the false, has been decidedly small. It is always difficult to trace rumors. They seem to come out of the air, so to speak. They may start harmlessly, even, but assume sinister form in their travels through the financial district. There is no way of running them down. They are elusive, but work insidiously to undermine confidence. So acute did the situation become a few days back that a group of prominent bankers took cognizance of the condition and co-operated with the Committee on Business Conduct of the New York Stock Exchange. Whether or no any success attended the joint efforts is not known. But at any rate, the rumors are perhaps a little less persistent, a little less disturbing.

Where these rumors strike at the financial structure of various companies there has, in the past, been little undertaken to combat them, except the stilted denials which only add fuel to the flame. The very fact that the company deems it necessary to make a denial is often construed as a sign of weakness. Last week, however, there came to light a new and apparently effective weapon against the rumor-monger. The Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Company had been traduced in the rumor market, and the gossip was of such an untruthful character that the company called into its office a number of the financial writers and said: "Here is the situation. We have nothing to hide. Our books are on the table. You can make such examination of them as you will and use such facts as you wish

## Dividends Passed Since First of the Year

Name of Company.	Outstanding Capital.	Payment Omitted.	Name of Company.	Outstanding Capital.	Payment Omitted.
Ajax Rubber.	\$10,000,000	\$200,000	Loew's, Inc., (no par)		
Amal. Lea. pf.	5,000,000	87,500	(shs.)	1,060,780	530,390
Am. Beet Sug.	15,000,000	300,000	Lackawa. Steel (shs.)	351,085	526,627
Am. Chiclé pf.	3,000,000	45,000	Mid. S. & Ord. (\$50)	100,000,000	1,000,000
Am. Cot. Oil pf	10,198,600	305,958	Mol. Pl. 1st pf.	7,500,000	131,250
Am. Drug Syn. (\$10)	6,779,830	271,193	Mol. Pl. 2d pf.	1,500,000	22,500
Am. H. & L. pf	13,000,000	227,500	Mullins Body (no par)		
Am. Linseed..	16,750,000	125,625	(shs.)	100,000	100,000
Am. Sm. & R.	60,998,000	609,986	National Acme (\$50)	25,000,000	437,500
Anacon. Cop.	116,562,500	2,331,250	Okla. P. & Ref.	20,800,000	416,000
Am. Agri. Ch.	33,322,100	666,442	Okla. P. & Ref. pf.	3,000,000	60,000
Am. Ag. Ch. pf	28,455,200	426,728	Pac. Mail S. S.	1,500,000	150,000
Am. Bos. Mag. (no par)			Pierce-Ar'w pf	10,000,000	200,000
(shs.)	96,000	120,000	Punta A. Sug. (\$50)	11,637,150	145,464
A., G. & W. I. S. S. pf.	13,742,900	171,786	Ray Con. Cop.	15,771,790	394,295
Cambria Steel (\$50)	45,000,000	675,000	Rem. T. 1st pf.	3,998,000	69,965
Ches. & Ohio Railroad	62,792,600	1,255,852	Rem. T. 1st pf "S."	1,201,400	21,024
Carbon Steel..	3,000,000	60,000	Rem. T. 2d pf.	4,994,000	99,880
Cent. Leath. pf	33,297,550	582,707	Rep. Iron & St.	30,000,000	450,000
Cluett-Peabody	18,000,000	270,000	Sup. Oil (no par)	454,708	227,354
Colum. Grapho. (no par)			Savage Arms 2d pf.	222,200	3,333
(shs.)	1,268,186	317,006	Sears R'buck.	105,000,000	2,100,000
Continent. Mot	14,607,250	146,072	Sloss-Shef. I. & S.	10,000,000	150,000
Consol. Textile (no par)			South P. Rico.	11,205,600	168,084
(shs.)	802,911	602,183	Strberg Carb. (no par)		
Cudahy Pack. 7% pf.	6,550,500	229,267	(shs.)	75,000	37,500
Cudahy Pack. 6% pf.	2,000,000	60,000	U. S. Sm. & R.	17,558,888	526,767
Callahan Z. & Lead (\$10).	4,629,900	92,598	United Al'y St. (no par)		
Cerro de Pas. (no par)			(shs.)	525,000	525,000
(shs.)	898,230	449,115	Va.-Car. Ch.	27,984,400	419,766
Col. Grapho. pf	9,883,731	172,965	Va.-Car. Ch. pf	21,568,573	431,371
Cuba C. S. pf.	50,000,000	875,000	V. Vivaudou (no par)		
Goodrich, B. F. (no par)			(shs.)	300,000	75,000
(shs.)	601,400	902,100	Vanadium St. (no par)		
Gulf States St. 2d pf.	84,100	126,150	(shs.)	373,334	373,334
Hab. Elec. Cab. (no par)			Wickwire Steel (no par)		
(shs.)	135,000	202,500	(shs.)	250,000	.....
Hocking Val..	11,000,000	110,000	Wilson & Co. (no par)		
Hydraulic Steel (no par)			(shs.)	202,500	253,125
(shs.)	225,849	169,386	Total.....		\$24,789,121
Int. Ag. Ch. pf.	13,055,500	163,191			
Kennecott Cop. (no par)					
(shs.)	2,787,081	1,393,540			



to." It was significant that the rumors as to Pierce-Arrow died a quick death. If other companies that are unjustly attacked could have the same courage, a weapon would have been forged against insidious rumor, designed for stock market manipulation, such as could not be improved upon.

**B**UT all rumors are not false. Some of them bear a grain of truth; some a full measure of truth, and it is undoubtedly true that the rumors, truthful and untruthful, have had a serious and disturbing effect upon the stock market recently. But primarily, the action of the stock market is hinged on the adverse business situation of the country, affecting alike banking, railroad and industrial companies. Added to this, there are the specific influences relating to individual groups of stocks or to individual stocks. For instance, the decline of some \$50 per share in Mexican Petroleum, within the span of a few days, was purely an outgrowth of a situation in Mexico. In the first place, the old rumors were renewed that the Mexican fields were nearing the exhaustion of their oil content. Whether it is true or not, no man can say. The proven area in Mexico is small, part of it has gone to salt water, but it is beyond the knowledge of any one as to whether the rest of the field is going quickly to salt water, and it seems rash to assume, even should it ultimately go

to salt water after producing millions of barrels of oil, that there is no other oil to be found in Mexico or in the vast acreage which is now held by the oil companies. But, added to salt water rumors, came the news of a heavy impost to be levied by the Mexican Government on the exportation of crude oil, a tax such as would preclude further operations by the oil companies because of the fact that the cost of producing, combined with the tax, would not permit of competition with American crude.

In the case of railroad stocks, conditions are no worse for the railroads now than they were at the first of the year. In fact, it might be said, that the outlook is decidedly improved. On July 1 national agreements and all that they meant in the way of excess costs will be abrogated, and the new wage scale, with a saving of \$300,000,000 a year, will go into effect.

But Wall Street has not been looking for the constructive element. It has been emphasizing the adverse. It shows evidence of great fear when some railroad dividends are passed and others cut. It harps upon low earnings of the moment, overlooking or ignoring the possibility of a business revival, and the movement of the big grain crops from the West which always pour money into the coffers of the railroads engaged in this traffic. Whether or no the railroads will be able to earn the 6 per cent. return as provided for in the Transportation act

may be a matter of doubt, but, at least it can be said that the indications all point to constructive efforts, both on the part of the railroads and the Government, and ultimately, it is to be expected, the railroads will be rehabilitated, as they must be since they are the arteries of commerce. But there has been heavy liquidation of railroad stocks in the last few days, based not on what is to come in the future but rather on what has transpired in the past.

**T**HE steel industry is in the throes of a serious depression. Probably no industry has been so fully able to conserve its war profits at this. But the steel stocks are going down. They have been sold, apparently, regardless of intrinsic value behind the issues. When United States Steel last week almost broke through \$70 per share, it represented a price that was the lowest in the last five years, a price that by the known figures can be only a faint reflection of the asset position of the corporation. It might be said, literally, that in buying the stock at this level, the investor was actually buying dollars at a discount, for the cash position of the company, the holdings of Liberty bonds and certificates of indebtedness of the Treasury Department, all liquid, would total up higher than the market price of the shares at the present time. But the steel business is falling

off. It has reached a state when many plants have been forced to close down. The industry as a whole is operating at not better than 30 per cent. of capacity, and probably the figure is nearer 20 per cent. It is a sad decline, by comparison, with the prosperity of only a short time ago. But, to judge of the present by the action in the stock market, one would have to assume that the period of depression was never to pass, and that asset position was of little consequence.

All in all, one cannot get away from the fact that Wall Street is in a sombre mood. It is prone to look for the adverse factors rather than to be optimistic as to the future. Wall Street moods are of passing moment, but when they rule, whether the market be going up or going down, the swing is carried too far. In the present instance it seems certain the swing of the pendulum toward pessimism has gone far beyond the point of reason, with reference to the issues of seasoned character, and probably this will be more clearly evident in the course of the next few months.

Frozen credit is slowly but surely thawing out, the banking situation is weekly showing signs of improvement, the foundation is being laid for the return of business to a normal and at least fairly profitable basis, and as these factors gain increasing strength the stock market may be expected to reflect the rosier outlook.

## The Legislative Week in Washington

Special Correspondence of the Annalist.

WASHINGTON, June 25.

**A**T the request of President Harding, Senator Penrose of the Senate Finance Committee has introduced a bill which would give Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, with the approval of the President, full authority to arrange for refunding of wartime obligations of foreign nations held by the United States. In a letter to the President Secretary Mellon indicates that some, at least, of the foreign nations are in no position to pay either principal or interest at this time. Hearings on the bill will start Wednesday, with Secretary Mellon as the first witness.

Chairman Fordney of the House Ways and Means Committee has told President Harding that the Permanent Tariff bill would be presented to the House this week, and that action on the Revenue bill would be pushed. The President is understood to have urged speed. Senator Watson believes that a high tariff law will be favored and the Revenue bill rushed.

Senator Borah attacked the soldiers'

bonus legislation, and forces opposed to its passage are rallying to the fight. Where a short time ago passage of the bill was believed certain, there is now said to be a chance of its defeat in the Senate. Opposition by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States is aiding in the fight.

Charles G. Dawes of Chicago, chosen as Director of Budget by President Harding, announces that he will call on a number of experienced business men to aid in the work of putting the Government on a business basis. He calls the machinery provided by Congress "pitiful," and promises to fight for strict economy to reduce the tax budget.

Senator Penrose announced that the Senate and House would soon be taking three-day recesses under an agreement that no important business should be transacted until fiscal legislation is ready. He predicted that the Finance Committee would require at least a month to consider the Tariff bill when it reached the Senate, and that final action would not be before October.

Attorney General Daugherty an-

nounced that suit soon would be brought against a New York concern in connection with the activities of open-price associations. The case, he said, was involved in the investigation by the Lockwood committee.

Republican members from fifteen States, chiefly in the upper Mississippi Valley, who are opposing the proposed tariff duty on lumber, decided to have the matter brought before a caucus before the Permanent Tariff bill reaches the House.

A bill to permit Cubans to ship cigars, cigarettes and cheroots into the United States in quantities less than 3,000, the minimum shipment under the existing law, was introduced by Chairman Fordney of the House Ways and Means Committee.

The House passed and sent to the Senate a bill authorizing the Philippine Government to increase the limit of indebtedness from \$15,000,000 to \$30,000,000.

The House Banking Committee favorably reported a bill authorizing the Treasury Department to deposit with the Federal Farm Loan Bank system the differ-

ence between the paid-in capital of the banks and \$50,000,000.

The Ways and Means Committee of the House voted down a proposal to impose an import tax on crude oil in the Permanent Tariff bill.

The House bill to regulate the meat-packing business was passed by the Senate, with a few amendments, and must now be considered in conference. The bill is much less rigid than the original Senate bill, which would have named a Commissioner to have charge of the regulatory features, while the House bill leaves this in the hands of the Secretary of Agriculture. Reports are that a compromise was reached because the President had indicated he would veto the original Senate bill if it was adopted.

The National Coal Association is attacking the Senate bill for regulation of the coal industry, terming it paternalistic and a step toward Government control. Opposition to the bill is growing, but indications still are that it will be adopted. Opponents of the bill allege that such legislation is the opening wedge to Government control, which gives heart to Government ownership advocates.

## Allies Control Richest Districts of Western Germany

**L**ITTLE attention generally seems to have been paid to the fact that the Allies now control the customs of the richest and most varied manufacturing districts of Western Germany, states a report of the Guaranty Trust Company of New York. The import and export duties in the territory must be paid to the order of the Allies' Commissioners, and a line of Custom Houses is being established to the east of the occupied territories. As one writer puts it, "the Allies have their hands, so to speak, on the throttle valve of Germany's most valuable industrial region, and can increase or diminish its exports or imports at will. Should German competition prove too severe, an increase in the export duties on the Rhine will enable the Allies to obtain the necessary relief for their industries, although, it may be, at the expense of the Reparation Fund. The productive activity of the Rhine Province can also now be regulated by the Allies, who have only to advance duties on raw materials to bring its trade to a standstill. The result of such a policy would probably be the

transference of factories to places over the frontier, in which case Holland, Belgium and Switzerland would be the first to benefit. Yet if the Allies' object is to raise revenue from the occupied territory for reparation purposes, their policy will naturally be to check the tendency, and by imposing moderate duties to stimulate production for their own benefit. In any case we are on the eve of a most interesting fiscal experiment."

The correspondent in Germany of the Federation of British Industries commenting upon the recently published figures of German import and export trade during the last twelve months states that both the Government and industry have prepared a series of counter measures against the sanctions. These measures will include the granting of the most extensive facilities to exporters, and the imposition of difficulties in the way of importation of goods from the Allies. Exhaustive deliberations have been taking place recently in official quarters, and although an actual program has not yet been fixed the general principles have been, it is understood, agreed upon.



### State of New York

#### Gold 5% Bonds

Due Serially 1942-1967, inclusive

Exempt from New York State Income Tax and free from all Federal Income Taxes.

Legal investment for Savings Banks and Trustees in New York, all New England and other States.

To yield about  
4.70%

Circular on request for TA-398

### The National City Company

Main Office—National City Bank Bldg., New York

Uptown Office—42nd St. & Madison Ave.

Bonds

Preferred Stocks

Acceptances



# The United States and the Gold Standard

By John Oakwood



**A**RGUMENT for permanent abandonment of the use of gold for monetary purposes by the European nations, with the substitution of a paper monetary mechanism, is not so fanciful but

what English gold mining interests are giving serious thought to the effect of such a movement upon the value of their South African properties. If the British are worrying lest gold become a drug on the market, the question contains points of interest for America, possessed, as it is, of the greatest stock of gold ever accumulated by any nation in the history of the world. These are, indeed, some new aspects to the world gold question at present that give it a very different interest from the time-worn sound money controversy.

The present basis for raising the question is the fact that the countries of Continental Europe, which, perforce, universally abandoned gold convertibility as a result of war conditions, have made no visible effort toward a reversion to the gold standard. England stands alone in the progress she has made toward this end. In fact, many European economists have seriously advanced the thought that the difficulties in the way of re-establishing the gold standard for Europe are insurmountable and that, therefore, the only way to achieve a stable currency situation is to devise a financial system which dispenses with the use of gold.

Thought on this subject among economists and financial authorities runs through many gradations. Some deride the notion of the abandonment of gold as the ultimate basis of monetary values as an unthinkable economic heresy whose fallacies, they say, have been proved time and again by previous experience. Others, while looking upon a non-gold monetary system as impracticable with the world's present financial organization, however believe that, when commerce and finance have reached a much more advanced stage of development and control, the ultimate progress of international banking and the evolution of a more efficient credit system will make it possible to dispense with gold. Pure economic considerations would then serve as the standard of value and regulator of price levels without a commodity-monetary medium. A somewhat middle ground between these two is taken by those who would maintain the gold standard but also admit the hopeless depreciation of paper currencies in Europe. They propose that Governments meet this situation by officially recognizing this depreciation, fixing the present fractional value of paper money in respect to its former gold content and making it convertible into gold at this new ratio.

Meanwhile, whether the permanent abandonment of the gold standard is economically practical or not, the actual state of affairs is that Europe continues to operate on the basis of purely fiduciary money, that the prospect of a return to the gold standard there seems about as remote as the prospect of complete disarmament and that it is becoming more remote every day as gold continues to flow to the United States. On June 1, 1921, the total stocks of gold in the United States amounted to \$3,175,000,000. This was an increase of \$391,000,000 since the first of the year, and of more than half a billion since May, 1920. At the beginning of the war America's stocks of gold were \$1,887,000,000. Therefore the increase as a result of the war has been about 60 per cent. It is estimated that 40 per cent. of the world's total stocks of monetary gold is now in the United States and that, if the present rate of inflow con-

tinues, America will hold fully one-half of such gold by the end of this year.

In view of these facts contemplation of the idea of the permanent abandonment of gold as a monetary medium raises some interesting speculations in respect to the effect of such action on the United States. It is estimated that the total monetary stocks of gold in the world are about \$8,000,000,000. The additional amount used in the arts is not subject to accurate estimate, but guesses, official and otherwise, run from two to four billion dollars. If gold's monetary use were abandoned on a large scale, the question arises as to whether there would be sufficient technical employment of it and demand for jewelry, plate and other trinkets in the world to absorb the tremendous stocks thus released. It is obvious the abolition of gold as a monetary commodity would result in a great drop in its value. In such a cataclysm of unsettled values the United States would be the chief sufferer. In fact America would be left holding the bag.

**T**HE gold that is flowing to the United States is virtually being forced upon this country in exchange for our commodities. It is not being sent to us to meet any economic needs of our own, such as to supply us, in exchange for our securities, with capital to exploit and develop the country or to serve as the basis for a needed expansion of currency and credit, since both of these have continued to contract in the face of the inflow of gold. In other words, there is not a natural economic attraction for gold in the United States. It is coming because of unnatural conditions in Europe. The dislocation of foreign exchange, the lack of adequate long-time credit facilities and Europe's falling credit here have made it necessary for Europe to send more gold in exchange for the goods that she must have and is not yet in a position to provide for herself. Europe is no longer using goods and services to attract gold, but is using gold to attract goods, continuing the abandonment of the gold standard as a basis for her currency systems, without any apparent pretense of trying to attract gold back as a means of returning to a gold standard. Meanwhile—and this is a significant social fact—the populations of Europe are becoming so used to doing business without gold that they look upon it almost with suspicion, accepting paper money in payment in preference since it now passes more current than gold.

Europe is getting from America all the commodities that she can with which to clothe and feed herself, and materials to use in the erection of useful structures, and is letting the United States accumulate the commodity whose chief value lies in serving a function that has gone out of style for the present in almost every country in the world but the United States—that is, serving as a monetary basis. If the abandonment of the gold standard were made permanent, America would be left with a vast accumulation of a metal whose principal use was gone, and, therefore, this country would absorb the major part of the loss resulting from the consequent depreciation of its value. Europe would not weep at that.

While abandonment of the gold standard is vigorously opposed by authoritative and influential interests in all countries, and although no country which was on a gold basis before the war has as yet definitely abandoned the gold standard as a permanent national policy, nevertheless, there probably never was a greater temptation to do so than now; nor was there ever a greater opportunity for spe-

cious political arguments appealing to popular cupidity or supposed national self-interest. The lessons of previous disastrous national experiences in paper-money experiments in a world generally on the gold standard are somewhat obscured by the special conditions of the present case, which give a demagogic economic mind ready pretexts for sweeping aside the teachings of history as not being now applicable. Never before was the modern world as a whole so far away from the gold standard. Never was so large a proportion of the world's gold stocks piled up in one nation to the detriment of the others, and never were other nations so greatly in the debt of one nation, as a result of necessitous purchases, as Europe now is in respect to the United States.

It is true that the weight of real authority is for the ultimate reversion to a gold standard throughout the world. The policy agreed upon at the International Financial Conference at Brussels put that meeting on record as favoring the gradual reduction of paper currency and the ultimate restoration of gold convertibility. It is generally recognized that the only fundamentally and economically sound way in which the gold standard can be restored in the countries now lacking it is through a gradual return of price levels to international equilibrium on a deflated basis, a free interchange of commodities and the building up of balances of trade in favor of countries now insufficiently supplied with gold, so as to enable them to draw back from the United States the metal they lost to it under stress of war exigencies. This would involve years of thrift and hard work and a discharge of debts by means of commodities. It is pointed out by an English authority that the ideal method of readjusting the present distorted international banking position would be a campaign of deflation to be undertaken by all countries simultaneously under international direction.

Perhaps these ideal economic proposals do not give full consideration to the social and political forces and purely human impulses and motives involved. In the first place, the history of the period since the war shows that solutions of great financial problems requiring altruistic co-operation of financial and commercial interests, in place of profitable competitive activities, are not feasible. Commercial and financial interests individually, and nations as a whole, will do only what pays; economic idealism cannot be substituted for profits as the motive power of business.

Again, preachments of thrift, self-denial and years of hard work as a means of paying off debts to America and attracting back gold, while economically sound, have no special appeal to the popular imagination in Europe. If an apparently easier way out were proposed, such as can be speciously argued for the frank permanent abandonment of the gold standard, its appeal would be greater. In the heated rhetoric of adroit politicians much could be made of the argument that, since the gold went to America when prices were high, that is when gold was cheap in terms of commodities, therefore, the United States got it easily; whereas, as prices fall, that is, as gold becomes dearer in terms of commodities, it will be progressively more difficult, more expensive for Europe to get it back. That is, she will have to pay more in work and goods to get her gold back than America paid to get it away from her; therefore, it would not be merely a matter of building a balance of trade to draw the gold away, but of working doubly hard to build up a sufficiently large balance of trade to offset also the increasing price of gold in terms of goods, and as stability increased and

price deflation progressed it would take more and more work and goods for every dollar of gold won back. If it is possible to devise effective monetary systems, this argument runs, without gold, why exert useless years of labor in producing more cheap commodities to get that gold back than America ever paid in high-priced commodities to get it away? If money is put on a true economic basis of commodity values, with exchange conducted by credit currencies, why pay America all these extra years of toil just to get gold back? The gold standard is merely a matter of sentiment that isn't worth the price! Gold is an uneconomic medium that represents waste motion—let America keep it and charge off on her own books the loss in its depreciated value due to abandoning it as a money commodity!

**T**HE appeal to self-interest in this line of reasoning would obscure the many economic fallacies lurking in it, which makes it particularly dangerous as a political argument.

The foregoing considerations, if they do nothing else, tend to attract attention to the fact that gold of itself is not unassailable as the container of ultimate human values. Complacent satisfaction on the part of the United States in the fact that she is piling up a gold stock such as no nation ever possessed before should be tempered by consideration of the fact that there is such a thing as a movement over-reaching itself, and if it became too great an effort for the nations of Europe to recover their proportion of gold it is not inconceivable that popular movements would gain headway among them to repudiate their desire for gold as money. It is probable that the world was never confronted by a bigger temptation to tamper with the gold standard than it is today. No great grief would be felt among other nations if the result should be to assess the chief loss in gold values upon the mines and accumulations of the United States of America, and, secondly, upon the other great gold mining and owning country, England, which, while not yet back on a gold base, has made greater progress toward that end than the other countries of Europe.

In any event, it seems to be an outstanding fact in the world economic situation today that the United States is particularly interested in the maintenance of the gold standard for the world, since any material change would mean that the chief disadvantages would fall upon this country. If the amassing of gold in America tends to discourage a return to a world gold standard or furnishes argument for its permanent abandonment in Europe, it lays fresh emphasis on the need for investment in Europe as a means of stopping the gold flow to this country.

## A Study of Bond Values

**W**HETHER a long term 3½% or 4% bond selling at 50% or 60% of its par value, or one of the new issues yielding 8% or better, should be purchased, is a problem the average investor is meeting today.

A solution is offered for those who send for our Letter No. AK-33.

**A. B. Leach & Co., Inc.**  
Investment Securities

62 Cedar Street, New York  
Detroit Boston Cleveland Hartford  
Philadelphia Minneapolis Pittsburgh  
105 S. La Salle St., Chicago



# What Is to be the Future Price Level?

By Holbrook Working

**T**HE impression is prevalent in many quarters that the general price level must fall for some years to come. The expectation is that the course of prices must be very like the course of prices after the Civil War. The high level in 1920 was approximately the same as the high level of Civil War times. The drop after the Civil War was continuous, though not at a uniform rate, up to 1871, as shown by the solid black line in Chart 1. A brief revival in 1872 was followed by the panic of 1873, and prices again started downward, with no further check until 1879.

The argument from history may be carried further. In 1814, partly at least as a result of the War of 1812, prices in the United States, as indicated by the price index shown in Chart 1, reached almost exactly the same level as in the Civil War and the recent war. From this point they dropped precipitately until 1816, when the drop was checked for two years, only to be continued in 1818 and 1819.

To many the analogy appears clear. We must expect a similar drop from the high prices of 1920. But to the student of monetary theory the situations seem very different. To the layman the conclusion that a war means high prices and that these abnormally high prices must be followed by a sudden drop may appear natural. But any one who understands the causes of price changes goes further in his analysis.


Comparing the Civil War experience with our recent experience, a very marked difference appears. The highest prices in the Civil War period were reached in the last year of the war. The fall in prices began immediately. But in the present case, prices continued to rise for a year and a half after the end of the war. Surely there must have been some important difference in the two situations. One very important difference lies in the fact that the high prices of the Civil War were largely due to the depreciation of the currency. Prices were not quoted in money exchangeable in gold, but in greenbacks. On an average, for the entire year of 1864, it took more than two hundred dollars (\$203.30) in greenbacks to buy a hundred dollars in gold. The double line on the chart shows the actual prices of the greenback period converted to gold prices. But in the United States during the great war there was no departure from the gold standard. After the Civil War, the drop in prices up to 1873 was almost entirely due to the fact that greenbacks (in which prices were quoted) were gradually increasing in value due largely to the increased confidence in their redemption. It will be seen by glancing at the double line on Chart 1 that, when prices are converted to a gold basis, the drop in prices for several years after the Civil War was very slight. The drop which began in 1873 continued, with brief interruption, for more than twenty years and was due to factors not at all connected with the war.

In view of the great dissimilarity between the two situations it is not safe to argue that prices now will behave as they did after the Civil War. The conditions after the War of 1812 could similarly be shown to be not at all analogous to present conditions. The future course of prices cannot be predicted merely on an analogy with what has happened after previous wars. It can be predicted only from a careful study of the factors which have brought about the present situation and of the factors which may influence prices in the future.

It is well known that the amount of money available with which to do business

has a very great influence on the level of prices. If there is much business to be done and only a relatively small amount of money with which to carry on the business, the money will be valued very highly and prices will therefore be low. When money is scarce and valuable a little of it will go a long way. But when money is abundant it tends to be

the actual money in use. Professor Irving Fisher estimates that bank deposits subject to check are two to three times as effective in carrying on business as is actual money. Professor Fisher estimated that in 1918 more than sixteen times as much business was done with bank deposits as with actual money.† In 1913, the ratio between business done



**A**LL the charts shown herewith are "ratio charts," that is, charts drawn to a logarithmic scale. The effect is to show an increase of ten points from 100 to 110 as just as important as an increase of twenty points from 200 to 220; each involves the same relative increase. It is because the chart shows graphically the relative changes that it is called a ratio chart.

The index number for the United States is constructed from three separate index numbers. From 1810 to 1825 the index used is that prepared by Alvin H. Hansen from prices in Boston. From 1825 to 1860 the index is from a report of Secretary Chase based on prices in New York. From 1860 to date the index is that of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the portion from 1860 to 1890 having been computed by the bureau from price quotations in the so-called Aldrich report to the United States Senate, the

valued less highly. More of it must be paid for the things we wish to buy; prices are high.

When we speak of money we usually think of gold and silver money and the various kinds of paper money in common use. But in actual fact, most of the business of the country is not done with this kind of money, but with checks. Checks themselves, however, are not the real circulating medium. They are merely a convenient means of transferring the bank deposits. The amount of money a man has in his pocket determines the amount of cash he can pay out at any one time. So also the size of his bank deposit determines the size of the payment he can make by check. As an average for 1919, the total amount of money in circulation in the United States was a little over five and three quarters billions (actually 5,793 million dollars), while the amount of bank deposits subject to check was almost twenty-eight billions (actually 27,928 million dollars), almost five times as much.\*

As far as the effect on prices is concerned, these bank deposits which are usually not thought of as money, are more important, dollar for dollar, than

\*The figures are those given by Professor Kemmerer. In calculating the amount of money in circulation he took the total amount of money in the United States and deducted therefrom the amount held in the United States Treasury and also the reserves held against the Federal Reserve notes in circulation. Cf., Kemmerer, E. W., *High Prices and Deflation*.

remainder computed from quotations collected by the bureau. The figures here used were taken from an article by Ralph G. Hurlin in *THE ANNALIST* for April 11, 1921, but shifted to make 1900=100. During the greenback period the actual prices are also shown converted to a gold basis, using the figures of Wesley C. Mitchell, "Gold, Prices and Wages During the Greenback Period," to correct for the depreciation of the greenbacks.

The index number for Great Britain is constructed from two index numbers. From 1800 to 1860 the index number is that of Professor Jevons. Since 1860 the Sauerbeck-Statist index has been used. The data were obtained from W. T. Layton, "Introduction to the Study of Prices," Page 116; from Irving Fisher, "The Purchasing Power of Money," Page 254, and from *The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*.

with bank deposits and business done with actual money was about 12 to 1.

Because of the reserve requirements imposed upon the banks by law, and because of various other factors, primarily the habits of people in doing business, there must always be a fairly definite relation between the total amount of money in the United States and the total volume of bank deposits. Since 1913, however, the ratio between the two has changed considerably. This change has been chiefly the result of the provisions of the Federal Reserve act, as passed in 1913, and amended in 1917. According to Professor Kemmerer, the average cash reserve actually held by all the banks of the country against the total deposits of the country was 11.7 per cent. of the deposits in 1913. In 1919 this reserve was only 6.6 per cent. of the total deposits.

Let us sum up the conclusions which have thus far been reached. They are:

1. The level of prices depends very largely on the amount of money available to do the business of the country.
2. The "money" with which business is done is mostly bank credit in the form of bank deposits instead of actual money.
3. There is always a fairly definite relation between the amount of money and the amount of bank deposits in the country, but in the last few years bank deposits have been permitted to increase in amount

† Cf., *American Economic Review*, June, 1919.

faster than actual money has increased.

Putting these three facts together, we come to one very important conclusion: Under present conditions the level of prices depends very largely on the amount of bank deposits available for carrying on the business of the country. This is a very important conclusion to bear in mind.

The closeness of the relation between bank deposits and prices is shown in Chart 2. The heavy black line shows the changes in general price level as indicated by the index number of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, prices in 1913 being taken as 100 per cent. The dotted line shows the changes in the volume of bank deposits, the total amount in 1913 being taken as 100 per cent. It will be noted that prices did not start upward as soon as did the amount of bank deposits. Price level

**Table I.**  
**Changes in Bank Deposits, Monetary Circulation and Prices, 1913-1919**

Bank Deposits.			
Year.	Millions of Dollars.	Index.	
1913.....	12,678	100	
1914.....	13,430	106	
1915.....	14,411	114	
1916.....	17,840	141	
1917.....	21,273	168	
1918.....	27,928	220	
1919.....	23,771	188	
Monetary Circulation.			
Year.	Millions of Dollars.	Index.	Price Index.
1913.....	3,390	100	100
1914.....	3,505	103	100
1915.....	3,682	109	101
1916.....	4,159	123	124
1917.....	4,914	145	176
1918.....	5,793	171	212
1919.....	5,579	165	196




Table I is compiled from figures given in Kemmerer, "High Prices and Deflation." Bank deposits shown are the sum of the "average for dates of five or six Controllers' calls each year" for national banks and items "computed from figures published each year by the Controller of the Currency, and referring to a date about June 30" for State banks and trust companies. Monetary circulation is the total stock of money in the United States, less that held in the Federal Treasury and less the reserves held against Federal Reserve notes outstanding. Prices are the "All Commodities"



index of wholesale prices of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. does not follow bank deposits in any fixed and arbitrary fashion. But, once prices got started upward, their increase was in almost exactly the same proportion as the increase in bank deposits.


This chart also shows strikingly the fact which has already been explained, that the amount of actual money in the country does not affect prices nearly as much as does the volume of bank deposits. The lighter solid line shows the percentage increase in the amount of money in the country.

Chart 2 also illustrates a second important point which must be carefully borne in mind, a point which has just been referred to. Although the price level depends very largely upon the amount of bank deposits available for doing business, it does not depend solely upon the amount of bank deposits. Even though the amount of bank deposits were to remain practically constant, the price level might fluctuate up and down a good deal with changing business conditions. It was the state of business conditions which kept prices from rising much in 1914 and 1915, when the amount of bank deposits would have permitted a much higher price level. Also it was the

Chart 3 shows two indexes intended to measure changes in the total production of the country and consequently to show roughly the amount of business to be done. Of course, if the amount of business to be done should increase as much as the amount of bank deposits with which it had to be carried on, there could not be any rise in prices. It will be seen, however, that the increase in the

**Table II.**  
**Indexes of Production**

Year.	War Industries Board.	Harvard University Committee on Economic Research.
1913.....	100	100.0
1914.....	99	97.7
1915.....	107	105.3
1916.....	111	111.4
1917.....	114	113.9
1918.....	116	113.1
1919.....		106.9




The War Industries Board index, prepared by Wesley C. Mitchell, appears in "The Summary of the History of Prices During the War," War Industries Board Price Bulletin 1. The Harvard index shown is the unadjusted index of agriculture, mining and manufacture, combined, weighted according to values of 1909 and shifted to 1913=100. Cf. Review of Economics Statistics, January, 1921.

**Table III.**  
**Changes in Bank Deposits, Money, and Prices Monthly Since January, 1919**

Year and Month.	Net Deposits in Federal Reserve Member Banks in Leading Cities.		General Stock of Money in the United States (Millions of Dollars.)	Prices—Bureau of Labor Statistics "All Commodities" Index.
	Number of Banks.	Millions of Dollars.		
<b>1919.</b>				
January .....	763	10,145	7,781	203
February .....	771	9,787	7,612	197
March .....	771	10,036	7,566	201
April .....	773	10,097	7,587	203
May .....	771	10,323	7,615	207
June .....	770	10,375	7,592	207
July .....	773	10,512	7,588	218
August .....	770	10,777	7,525	226
September .....	774	10,902	7,564	220
October .....	776	11,019	7,663	223
November .....	783	11,284	7,722	230
December .....	796	11,204	7,783	238
<b>1920.</b>				
January .....	798	11,609	7,961	248
February .....	804	11,478	7,745	249
March .....	808	11,551	7,806	253
April .....	811	11,599	7,761	265
May .....	810	11,389	7,756	272
June .....	812	11,535	7,805	269
July .....	814	11,486	7,887	262
August .....	815	11,312	7,928	250
September .....	819	11,252	7,997	242
October .....	820	11,230	8,136	225
November .....	823	11,094	8,255	207
December .....	823	10,837	8,281	189
<b>1921.</b>				
January .....	829	10,938	8,373	178
February .....	828	10,653	8,171	167
March .....	824	10,518	8,085	162
April .....	822	10,271		157

Table 3 is compiled from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, and from publications of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The deposits are "net demand deposits on which reserve is computed" for member banks in the principal cities of the United States, and apply to the first Friday of each month. They include over one-third of the total deposits of the country. The number of banks included has increased materially in the period covered, but a large part of this increase is representative of the natural growth of banking in the country. Part of the increase represents growth of the Federal Reserve system at the expense of banks outside the system, but it is impossible to make correction for this element. After careful comparison with the reports of the Controller of the Currency, the writer feels justified in accepting these figures for present purposes as an index of the changes in total bank deposits of the country. For comparison covering a period of more than one or two years the figures issued by the Controller of the Currency should be used in giving the deposits of all



banks for the last of June each year, and deposits of national banks for four or five other dates in each year. The "General Stock of Money in the United States" applies to the first of each month, and shows total stock in the country with no deductions. The price index is an average for the month.

total production was relatively slight as compared with the very great increase in bank deposits. temporary business conditions which permitted prices to rise more in 1917 and 1918 than the increase in bank deposits would seem to justify. The slight difference shown on the chart is insignificant, taken by itself. However, when it is considered that there was probably an unusually large amount of business done in those years, as shown by the production indexes shown in Chart 3, the difference takes on some significance.

We are now ready to discuss the recent tremendous drop in prices and the probably future price changes. We need simply bear in mind:

1. That the general price level depends very largely on the amount of bank deposits available for carrying on the business of the country.
2. That temporary business conditions will frequently cause the general price level to diverge considerably from the level indicated by the volume of bank deposits.

In Chart 4, the heavy solid line shows price changes monthly from January, 1919, down to the latest month covered by the figures of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The double line may be taken

as an index of the total amount of bank deposits in the United States. Actually it shows the deposits in all the Federal Reserve member banks in the principal cities of the United States as published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. These make up more than a third of the total bank deposits of the country and it may be assumed that the deposits of the other banks fluctuate much as these do. No other monthly figures on bank deposits are available. From Chart 2 it appears that the relation between bank deposits and prices was approximately normal in 1919. Consequently the scales in Chart 4 have been so chosen as to bring the prices and bank deposit lines close together in 1919.

It will be seen that throughout 1919, as in the two preceding years, the increase in prices can be explained largely on the basis of the increase in bank deposits, remembering, of course, that the increase in prices was also dependent upon favorable business conditions. Beginning in November, 1919, the Federal Reserve Banks began to try to check the continued increase in deposits. The really drastic increases in discount rates were made in January. Many economists had been urging the banks for months to take steps to check in-

crease in deposits. The move was finally made as a result of stern necessity. Deposits had increased to such an extent that it was becoming difficult for some of the Federal Reserve Banks to maintain the required reserves. If matters had been allowed to go much further, all the banks would have been in a very serious position.

As will be seen from the chart, there was no sharp deflation. The policy begun in November of 1919 decreased bank deposits only about five per cent. in the course of the next year. The tremendous drop in prices which has taken place is not the result of deflation, but of temporary business conditions. Despite the checking of the increase in bank deposits, prices continued to rise. By May prices had reached a point far above that justified by the volume of bank deposits. The high price level was the result of an extended period of extreme business prosperity. Then came the reaction. Since May, 1920, prices have dropped precipitately. Prices of farm products have dropped even more than other prices. While the general index shown in Chart 4 stood at 167 in February, the index of prices of farm products stood at 129. But these low prices are not to be explained on the ground of so-called deflation of the currency. Like the high prices of the early part of 1920 and like the relatively low prices of 1914 and 1915 (shown in Chart 2), they are the result of temporary business conditions.

The present severe business depression cannot last indefinitely. Several economists and students of business conditions have predicted a revival of business during the latter part of this Summer. At present most experts think the revival will not be noticeable until somewhat later. The question of just when the revival of business will come cannot be discussed here, but come it must, sooner or later. When it does prices will rise. But how much will they rise?

With the return of normal business conditions, prices will return to somewhere near their normal relation to bank deposits. The question, then, is, What is going to happen to bank deposits? Until we begin to ship out some of the large amount of foreign gold which has flowed into the country since the war began, the volume of bank deposits will depend largely on the policy of the Federal Reserve Board. In the last year we have imported much more gold than we have exported. It is this excess of imports over exports which has been responsible in considerable part for the increase in the total stock of money in the United States, as shown by the upward trend of the dotted line in Chart 4. Until European countries get on a sound financial basis we may expect to maintain or even increase the supply of gold in the country. Therefore we may look forward to a considerable period during which the volume of bank deposits will depend primarily upon the policies of the Federal Reserve Board. Assuming that there will be no change in the laws, it is possible to calculate approximately the decrease in bank deposits which the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Banks could bring about. Their power lies in the possibility of retiring all Federal Reserve notes, thus reducing the amount of money in the country and consequently the money available for bank reserves and in the possibility of building up the reserves of the Federal Reserve Banks themselves, perhaps even holding 100 per cent. reserves.

It is impossible to go into the details of the computation here, but the writer calculates that the maximum reduction in bank deposits which the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Banks could bring about would result in a decrease of one-fourth or possibly close to one-third from the level of February, 1921.

This is a theoretical maximum decrease which it is entirely improbable that the board would consider. In fact, there is much ground for thinking that



# Rewards of Wartime Development Not Unmixed

By Robert J. McFall

**D**OES the law of compensation control national prosperity? It is a serious question in international affairs what benefit comes to any nation by forging ahead of its neighbors. May we not be like a team of several horses hitched up to the one wagon where the ambition of one in outdoing its mates avails it nothing in the long run? The greatest national progress has come when progress came to the group of nations.

It is worth a serious thought whether or not the tremendous lead we have acquired over our neighbors may bring compensations not so pleasing to our taste. If we are a team hitched to the same chariot of progress, may it not be that our very lead over our fellows may force us to await their recovery? In a family of nations trading together freely, certainly the tendency is for all to approach a common level of prosperity. Certainly, also, it is progress, or increase of attainment, that brings nations what they have learned to call prosperity. If this be so it may be Germany that will experience the greatest prosperity of the next few decades, while we, on the other hand, may be loaded down by our present attainments. In such an event our safety would lie in the general expansion due as compensation to the whole world. This might modify even a comparative waiting for others in the race into a degree of progress sufficient for our real well-being.

The drop in prices of these last few months is not peculiar to the United States. Neither is the lack of employment and the business depression. The slump started in Japan and hit the other great countries before we were seriously affected. However, in the consequent readjustment as well as the depression we shall have our share, and shall be confronted with conditions which most of us have not yet fully faced.

When the end will be and on what level of price it will be are hard to determine. We have not yet seen the end of the depression. It is hard to believe that we can see the end until some of the larger financial questions are settled, at least in principle. The one great thing standing in the way of renewed economic activity is some reasonably settled basis upon which to calculate values. Who wants to buy anything but what he needs for immediate consumption until he has some idea of the worth of that thing next month? It is hard enough to merchandise goods even for quick consumption on such a market. To sell for a renewed production is almost impossible.

Uncertainties as to values are begotten of uncertainties of finance. The two biggest uncertainties in the financial world have been the German indemnity, now fixed, and the armament program. Until these are settled in principle we need not look for a rejuvenated business, for the amount of credit and the proportion of productive capacity available for the reconstruction of peace are not known.

Prices in most European countries until this recent decline had risen to very high levels if measured in terms of their own units of currency. But this measure of a price increase means little to and but those few resident individuals who are dependent upon a fixed income. In normal times we measure comparative prices in terms of gold. Our gold is the only quantity of consequence still subject to free currency use; it is United States gold which must be the basis for international values, and the trading level which our gold has when these present violent fluctuations cease will determine the new level of prices. An early settlement of the bigger financial problems will crystallize the level of prices

on a relatively high plane, while a long-delayed settlement may bring levels down much lower.

It need not be supposed that all countries will attempt to bring their units of currency up to the former par with our dollar. It is not necessary to return to the gold basis, nor is it desired ethically or economically. Countries whose currency is less than 1 per cent. of its former value in our money or in gold would be foolish to attempt such a scheme. Such an attempt would amount to a public donation to the present money holders at the expense of the taxpayers. A German mark is not worth 24 of our cents today, and to make it so would be giving one class of German citizens an unexpected value at the expense of another class. It seems inevitable that those European countries whose currencies are worst inflated must accept a present value of their unit in the near future in terms of gold and proceed on this new basis. All that would be necessary in Germany would be to establish a new unit of currency equal in value to a gold mark, and make the old marks cents in a decimal system! So no one would be robbed within Germany, and those with whom she trades would not be kept from doing business by the load of uncertainty caused by an attempt to restore old values to new marks. The same is true of many of the European countries other than England. British prices are not so badly inflated today as ours were last year. She could pay gold in domestic transactions now as well as we did. To attempt to pay gold in foreign trade before her trade balance recovers would certainly bring the disaster of the export of all her stock. However, it is but a question of a short time before her balance of trade will recover sufficiently for her to recover her gold basis completely. For the Continental powers to await the recovery of the old value of their currency before adopting gold payments is to delay the world prosperity which the law of compensations awards us.

**T**HE extent of deflation depends in large part upon the time consumed before the foundation is laid for new confidence. Almost every week brings about some new price decline, which means a lower general average and greater deflation. Of course it is impossible for this to continue indefinitely. Failing an early revival of business we should have motionless depression as in the '90s. Deflation should normally proceed until the available credit is merely sufficient to accommodate well-balanced business demands. If it proceeds further, credit will simply be stored up awaiting another expansion and boom of prices.

Where the general deflation will stop is hard to tell. The inertia of high wages will tend to hold it most strongly from much greater progress. However, a continued depression awaiting Europe's adjustment would break over even that inertia. There seems no question but that it must continue until it is more evenly distributed, and prices reach a new level instead of the present jagged range of inequalities.

There is one phase of this problem which has not confronted many of us, and that is where we may find the compensations for our unwonted prosperity of the war. We have heard of Europe's inflated price levels, and our exporters started out to make a fortune selling at these inflated levels. That was before the fluidity of international exchange was re-established. As soon as this occurred it became evident that for some reason or other the price level of Europe was really below that of America in spite of what we thought was in the

law of supply and demand. Actually at the end of last year, while the general level of prices in the United States was 205 per cent. of 1913 prices, Europe's prices in terms of United States gold dollars were not anything nearly so expanded, and before the war we were all on the trading level of general equality. In terms of gold dollars England's prices were only 173 per cent. of those of 1913, France's 160, and Italy's only 120 at the last of 1920.

**M**OST impressive is the present level of German prices in terms of our money. It is difficult to find an accurate index of increase of prices in Germany in terms of marks. The best evidence comes from a record of prices in some months ago. This would place the level of German prices in German marks at only about 1000 per cent. of pre-war times. We say "only," because marks are not worth one-tenth of their pre-war rate in terms of our money. They are worth not more than 70 per cent. of one-tenth, which means that prices in Germany are not greater but less than before the war in terms of our money. Seventy cents would easily buy today what cost a dollar in 1913. And this applies to all goods made of German raw materials, and that part of the value of fabricated foreign raw materials which is based upon their labor.

The further behind in the economic race the war has left a nation, the lower are its present gold prices as compared with those of before the war. What advantages may accrue from this in a revival of foreign trade, rendered the easier by the strategic position of lower prices, we may ponder over in the light of the prosperity brought to us by a huge export commerce during the war.

The thing that really interests us the most is the effect which the export trade of these nations at low prices will have upon our economic life. We cannot receive European goods at nearly pre-war levels without having our prices reduced to meet the competition. Neither can we keep out the European goods unless we cancel all their debt to us, and give up all idea of exporting them anything more. In fact, unless we make them a present of all the excess of exports sent to them since the war began, we must face an importation from them much larger than our export. Even the interest on what they already owe us cannot be less than three-quarters of a billion a year. That means an annual import that much greater than our exports for interest alone. When it comes to payment of the principal the excess of imports must be so much the more; doubtless total upward of a billion dollars a year.

And all this weight of imports must be in goods valued in gold at less than our products are today. In fact, in gold values European goods are rapidly approaching pre-war levels on the average, and each month of financial uncertainty brings them down still lower!

Of course we do not want the payment in goods, especially at those prices. But no matter how much we wish to avoid the flood of cheap goods we cannot escape them or their effects. They will either come to us or go elsewhere, and ruin our export market and depress the prices on our imports from other places. We cannot get gold in return for their debts. There is only about half enough gold in all the world to pay Europe's debt to us. They have no other money we would want. We must take goods or nothing.

We might cancel their debt and give up our dreams of foreign trade. Since even China failed in attempting to continue such an exclusionistic policy there is little hope of our attempting this ex-

pedient. We do not want to, and we would be worse off so isolated than when subjected to foreign competition.

We must accept the competition of European goods in our domestic and our export markets. We must accept an excess of imports of at least a billion dollars a year when Europe recovers, if we are to collect the interest and part of the principal of our debt. If we expand our international services in the form of a large merchant marine the payment for this must be added to our imports of goods. If we canceled Europe's debt the imports would not be so excessive nor so cheap, but they would be present none the less to render overwhelming price competition.

Germany's payments of the indemnity will flood the rest of the world with cheap German goods. We have two factors working in international price comparisons. The inflation in each country expands its prices. An excess of imports over exports depresses the value of a nation's currency in comparison with others. The greater the excess of imports and the longer time exchange speculators calculate it will be before the balance of trade is rectified, the greater is the premium charged against that nation's money. The exchange merchants must have interest during the period of waiting, and they must be paid for their risks. Such a condition is inevitable. When we add to a heavy excess of imports an enormous bill for reparations or any other form of debt, we but add to the level to which exports must reach before the exchange reaches a balance. Exports must pay not only for present imports, but outstanding debts as well. And the heavier this burden of debt the greater will be the exchange rate until exports equal present imports, interest and amortization of principal of debt. And the greater the exchange rate the cheaper the exported goods will be.

**T**HE competition in price will not be rectified until the full competition in quantity is reached. On the other hand, the recovery of the export trade to anything like its balancing proportions will bring about a reduction in price competition. The probable result will be a flood of German exports heavy enough to amount to strong competition, but not heavy enough fully to rectify exchange. Such a situation would mean that German goods would be cheaper than ours no matter how low ours sunk, and would establish a German monopoly in any industrial line chosen by her. Her selection of goods for such monopolies would be limited by the degree to which imported raw materials formed their final value. Lines in which her own raw materials and labor formed the chief cost would be hers without rival on the world's market.

Those who see prosperity only in an excess of exports will be frightened by such a prospect. And those whose interests are hurt by a price decline will be injured by the price competition. Is such a situation harmful? Is it compensation for our war prosperity?

The theoretic economist, weighing matters only in the light of goods for consumption versus effort for attainment of those goods, must say that such a situation is fortunate and not evil. The more goods coming into the country in payment for past and not present effort, the richer we are. It is not money that makes riches, but available goods. The cheaper these available goods are the better off people are, for the less work it takes to acquire them. This should be true for all our population, the laboring man and the capitalist.

Unfortunately the experience of the race has some things to say against such a simplified view of affairs. There is the moral side. A reasonable amount of work is not a real sacrifice but a blessing. Too many free goods may be an



evil to the nation. A heavy excess of imports as tribute has been the undoing of more than one world power.

Aside from the question of general prosperity what classes of our population will be affected by such a condition of cheap imports? Certainly those who depend upon a fixed income will at last rejoice. So will those on salaries which are always relatively stable.

It is not easy to tell what will be the effect upon labor. It all depends upon its power to hang together and maintain a wage scale that will give it a decent share of the national income. Attempts to hold the wage scale unduly high can never be successful under such circumstances, but will only result in unemployment. Labor's share in the available commodities will depend upon its skill in bargaining, a skill that avoids overreaching and at the same time escapes being deprived of its rights.

What influence an excess of cheap imports will have naturally depends upon the weight such imports have in our total trade. If they amounted to a large proportion in our total production, we might be alarmed. If they are only a small portion the effect should not be so pronounced, certainly not disastrous.

Interest on what Europe owes us in both bonds and unpaid balances will amount to about three-quarters of a billion dollars a year when it is paid. Enough more to make the excess of imports amount to a billion a year would extend the final date of repayment of the principal to at least a half century from now. A billion dollars is a large sum when it is in cheap goods, and added to as much more as the amount of our annual exports. As compared with a recent annual import of \$7,950,429,180 and export of \$5,238,621,668, it is not so large as it is compared with a pre-war import of \$1,766,689,412 and export of \$2,428,506,358.

Perhaps a better comparison is with the total annual production of goods in

the United States. This was estimated during the war at about \$50,000,000,000. An excess of imports amounting to 2 per cent. would not be excessive. Perhaps 3 or 4 per cent. is a truer expression of the case when we discount the unusual amount of production and the high level of prices during the war. Even at 5 per cent. the situation should not be alarming. Authorities estimate that our average increase of staple commodities amounts to about 3 per cent. a year. When we add to the increase of any definite selection of commodities the new varieties of production which we see continually, we appreciate that at most our expansion can be retarded only by the amount of a year or two's progress and one year's progress has already been passed. If we are convinced that goods thrust upon us without the sacrifice of labor are a blessing, we cannot anticipate Utopia, nor can we be excessively alarmed if we see prosperity only in expansion and activity.

The greatest effect will come in price. It is true that there will be such competition in production of some goods and services that Europe's output will practically drive certain lines of ours off the market. It may take more than subsidies to keep the British ships from depriving the United States of the glory of a large merchant marine if England underwrites Europe's debts. If Germany is saddled with a fitting indemnity we need not attempt to compete with her chemical specialties. In price, however, will we see the greatest disturbance. As their trade recovers, however, their prices will recover, the general level of the value of their goods will rise, and nearly meet ours on the downward grade. From the time they nearly meet the two levels will move together either up or down as deflation or inflation occurs, theirs rising to ours as the debts are paid.

On whom the burden of price readjustment will bear the hardest is not easy to say. To every one as a consumer

it will not be a burden but a boon. The laboring classes who put forth a greater effort to supply their necessities for consumption should benefit when business recovers. However, they will be in competition with Europe, which simply must work and work hard, to recover, and our labor must not fail in efficiency.

Some lines of industry must suffer. Those which compete with Europe's specialties will have a serious time. A readjustment may be necessary, leaving to Europe the development of her own particular lines.

Agriculture will suffer if tariffs are retained on manufactured goods alone, which increase the farmers' cost of production. Even this last year we have imported more food than we exported. For some time the manufacturer has felt that agriculture needs special help to make cheap food for his employees. Soon he must realize that all agriculture needs is freedom from more than its share of handicaps. When he also realizes that a protective tariff is no more use to industry after the economic stage of foreign marketing has come than it would have been to the farmer when the whole stream of farm products was outward, the day of the farmers' tariff handicap will pass. This may be in time to save the farmer from bearing more than his share of European competition. The present strength of the farmers' lobbies at Washington should speed the day.

The effect on capital may not be negligible. A recent writer of note foresees only a decline in the values of current supplies. The merchant who has owned hides, leather, cotton or what not has suffered in the decline in value of his stocks. To that extent the much-cursed middleman has borne the burden. What of the man who owns fixed capital? His current supplies have fallen, will not his fixed assets? If the Iowa farmer's corn drops in price will not his land, which had also experienced the inflation in price? Will not all capital values re-

written or newly built on recent prices go the way of current supplies unless this price decline is only temporary? And few believe that it is only temporary. If this be so, few capitalists but bond or mortgage holders may fail to give their share.

However, in times like these such reorganizations can come without disaster. Fortunately most of our leading business ventures have prepared themselves against such a day. Those which are overcapitalized and have overbuilt for a trade which has left them will suffer, but those which have put up a large surplus will be ready for business again. The typical business concern of today is the opposite of the watered-stock concern of some years ago; at least in terms of war prices.

These compensations may come, must come, for our great expansion and accumulation of credits due to the war. If we were satisfied to live as far as possible upon our already earned income the effect would be disastrous. We shall not be, however, and we shall learn that expansion of activity and trade, even of exports to all the world, is easily possible with an excess of cheap imports. These imports will soon cut down our costs of production, and we shall expand on a new and healthier level of price. One thing we must learn, and that is that we cannot expect to predominate in all lines of commerce at once. We must specialize, and we must accept Europe's specialties. World trade will be based upon a division of labor.

It may be that we shall experience a distasteful compensation for our wartime development in a quieting down in our rate of expansion to allow our teammates to recover. That may not be an unmixed evil. And certainly we shall receive our share in the compensations of prosperity which will come as soon as financial readjustments are made and the rebuilding is assured. That will be our share of the blessing.

## What Is to be the Future Price Level?

Continued from Page 687

the board will not endeavor to bring about much further diminution in bank deposits. The fact that all the Federal Reserve Banks are now lowering their discount rates indicates a disposition not to force the deflation. It may be doubted if bank deposits are likely for a long time to drop much below the level which they had reached in 1918.

So much for the probable changes in bank deposits, while we retain the European gold which is now in our vaults. What will happen to bank deposits and to prices in that day, perhaps quite distant, perhaps relatively near, when we begin to send back the excess of gold which has accumulated in this country?

To answer this question it is necessary to consider the world situation as a whole. Look again at Chart 1. The solid line on this chart indicates the movements of prices in the United States; the dotted line indicates the movements of prices in Great Britain. It

will be seen that, with minor exceptions, the movements have been parallel for more than a hundred years. This simply illustrates the fundamental general principle that, except for minor temporary fluctuations, price movements in all gold-using countries must be the same. In normal times the price level in any one country is the result of conditions throughout the world.

There is but one thing of which we can be reasonably certain: Never again within the lives of most of us will prices generally be as low as in 1913. Just how much higher they will be is impossible to say. The only factor which appears likely to develop to cause a downward tendency of prices is the natural increase in the amount of business to be done. On the other side are several important factors which are likely to cause prices to rise. We may merely enumerate these without attempting to weigh their probable influence.

1. Until the extremely high prices of the war period brought somewhat of a check, the annual production of gold had been rapidly increasing. There seems to be no prospect of early exhaustion of the large deposits of low grade ore which are now being worked with profit and furnishing the larger part of the annual production.

2. The use of deposit banking has been increasing in all countries. The war has accustomed large numbers of people to deposit banking, and to the use of paper money, where formerly gold was the chief circulating medium.

3. Perfection of banking organization, as in the case of the Federal Reserve System in this country, has made it possible to maintain larger volumes of deposit credit on the reserves available.

4. There is a possibility of the adoption of bimetallism in some of the former belligerent countries as an aid in getting back on a sound financial basis. The world's supply of money might thus be augmented by the introduction into it of con-

siderable quantities of silver currency.

These predictions may be made:

1. The present low prices are temporary. Prices may go somewhat lower, but will rise again as soon as business revives.

2. Until Europe gets on a reasonably sound financial basis prices in this country will be largely determined by the volume of bank deposits as regulated by the policy of the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Banks. There are reasons for thinking that the volume of bank deposits will not be pushed much below the 1918 level.

3. When Europe again gets on a sound financial basis, prices will be determined by world conditions. It seems probable that prices then will be near the level they would have reached had the pre-war (1900-1914) rate of increase been maintained without the interruption of the war, and that they may be above that level.

They seem justified by the study we have made.

## Sugar Consumption in United States Makes New High Record

SUGAR consumption in the United States will make a new high record in the fiscal year ending with this month. The quantity imported from foreign countries, says a statement by the National City Bank of New York, was greater in the ten months for which figures are now available than in the corresponding period of any preceding year. The domestic production of the year was bigger than ever before and the exportation only about one-half that of the corresponding ten months of the preceding year. These official figures of the ten months' imports and exports, plus the domestic production for which a record is already established, give a net total available for consumption so much

in excess of any earlier year that we may not be surprised if the official figures showing the average per capita consumption in the fiscal year 1921 run up nearly to 100 pounds per capita, against 91½ pounds per capita in the fiscal year 1920, the former high record year; 82 pounds in 1919 and 89 pounds per capita in the high record pre-war year 1914.

This increase in sugar available for consumption in 1921 as against the already established record of 91½ pounds per capita for the fiscal year 1920 is not due to material increases in imports from foreign countries or our islands, but to increased domestic production and a big fall off in the exports. While the rec-


ords of imports from foreign countries do show an increase of 23,000,000 pounds in the ten months ended with April, 1921, as compared with the corresponding ten months in the fiscal year 1920, the former high record year, the imports from our islands in the same period show a slight reduction, suggesting that the total quantity of sugar brought into continental United States in the fiscal year 1921 will not differ materially from that of the fiscal year 1920, but the fact that the domestic production in the last year exceeded that of any earlier year by about a half billion pounds, and that the exports in the current fiscal year are only about one-half those of 1920, makes it apparent that the quantity available

for consumption in the fiscal year will materially exceed that of any preceding year.

One especially striking feature of this prospective new high record in sugar consumption lies in the fact that it has been made in the face of and in spite of the highest prices for sugar known in the experience of the present generation. Average import prices of raw sugar brought from foreign countries ranged from 8.3 cents per pound in March, 1920, to 16.1 cents in June, then slowly declined to 15 cents per pound in September, 11.3 cents in November, 9.8 cents in December, 6.1 cents in January, 1921, and 4.9 cents in March and April.



## Curve of the Food Cost of Living



An index number is a means of showing fluctuations in the average price of a group of commodities. The Annalist Index Number shows the fluctuations in the average wholesale price of twenty-five food commodities selected and arranged to represent a theoretical family's food budget.

## Financial Transactions

## BAROMETRICS

## The State of Credit

	Last Week.	Same Week Last Year.	Year to Date.	Same Period Last Year.
Sales of stocks, shares	4,808,321	1,897,365	90,166,431	122,130,980
Sales of bonds, par value	\$62,561,790	\$65,040,950	\$1,492,761,235	\$1,965,085,800
Average price of 50 stocks	{ High 62.42	{ High 83.39	{ High 73.13	{ High 94.07
	{ Low 58.35	{ Low 81.31	{ Low 58.35	{ Low 77.74
Average price of 40 bonds	{ High 67.82	{ High 66.65	{ High 71.60	{ High 72.51
	{ Low 67.56	{ Low 66.20	{ Low 67.56	{ Low 65.57
Average net yield of ten high-priced bonds	5.512%	5.680%	5.328%	5.389%
New security issues	\$13,300,000	\$25,000,000	\$1,024,301,000	\$889,809,000
Refunding		9,000,000	37,006,500	90,225,210

## POTENTIALS OF PRODUCTIVITY

## The Metal Barometer

	End of May 1921.	End of May 1920.	End of April 1921.	End of April 1920.
United States Steel orders, tons	5,492,487	10,940,466	5,845,224	10,359,747
Daily pig iron capacity, tons	39,394	96,415	39,768	91,327
Pig iron production, tons	1,221,221	2,988,881	1,103,041	12,739,797
*Month of May. †Month of April.				

## Alien Migration

	April, 1921.	March, 1921.	Feb., 1921.	Jan., 1921.	Dec., 1920.	Nov., 1920.
Inbound	64,000	63,714	58,303	66,506	79,590	73,458
Outbound	18,000	15,590	16,339	17,170	24,006	18,467
Balance	+46,000	+48,154	+41,964	+49,326	+55,584	+54,991
	April, 1920.	March, 1920.	Feb., 1920.	Jan., 1920.	Dec., 1919.	Nov., 1919.
Inbound	82,164	76,031	67,369	62,832	67,369	62,832
Outbound	20,618	18,983	29,979	27,565		
Balance	+61,546	+57,048	+37,390	+35,267		

## Building Permits (Bradstreet's)

	May 1921.	May 1920.	April 1921.	April 1920.	March 1921.	March 1920.
145 Cities.	145 Cities.	145 Cities.	100 Cities.	100 Cities.	155 Cities.	155 Cities.
\$125,905,709	\$118,744,243	\$146,232,331	\$185,564,488	\$118,436,947	\$145,923,799	

## MEASURE OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY

## Bank Clearings

	Entire country, estimated from complete returns from cities representing 92.3 per cent. of the total. Percentages show changes from preceding year.	The Last Week. P.C.	The Week Before. P.C.	Year to Date. P.C.
1921	\$6,464,000,000—22.6	\$7,480,000,000—21.2	\$174,732,000,000—20.6	
1920	8,356,000,000+11.6	9,507,000,000+8.7	220,142,000,000+24.2	

## Gross Railroad Earnings

	Second Week in June.	First Week in June.	Fourth Week in May.	Month of April.	From Jan. 1 to April 30.
1921	19 Roads.	20 Roads.	20 Roads.	201 Roads.	261 Roads.
1920	\$12,973,712	\$12,659,519	\$17,296,158	\$433,357,199	\$1,768,736,098
1920	14,344,922	14,148,035	19,814,490	462,281,913	1,787,910,869
Gain or loss	—\$1,371,210	—\$1,488,516	—\$2,518,332	—\$31,975,286	—\$19,174,771
	—10.80%	—10.52%	—12.89%	—7.44%	—1.09%

## WEEK'S PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES

	Current Minimum Price.	Range 1921.	High.	Low.	Mean Price 1921.	Mean Price of Other Years.
Copper: Lake, spot, per lb.	\$0.1275	\$0.1325	\$0.1175	\$0.1250	\$0.1275	\$0.16125
Cotton: Spot, middling upland, lb.	.1120	.1825	.1120	.1425	.20125	.32625
Cement: Portland, bbl.	2.40	4.80	2.50	3.90		
Fine: Nor. Car. Hoofers 6 in. per 1,000 ft.	28.00	29.00	27.00	28.00	46.50	44.00
Hides: Packers, No. 1 native, lb.	.14	.16	.0950	.1275	.30	.40
Petroleum: Pennsylvania crude at well, bbl.	2.50	6.10	2.50	4.30	5.55	4.50
Pig iron: Bessemer, at Pittsburgh, per ton	24.45	33.90	24.90	29.21	43.71	33.875
Rubber: Up River, fine, per lb.	.1550	.1925	.1550	.17375	.34125	.54
Silk: Japan, Shinshu, No. 1, per lb.	5.00	7.00	5.50	6.25	11.4275	

## Comparison of Week's Commercial Failures (Dun's)

	Week Ended June 23, 1921.	Week Ended June 24, 1920.	Week Ended June 26, 1919.	Week Ended June 27, 1918.	Week Ended June 28, 1917.
To: \$5,000. tal.	91	49	30	24	54
From: \$5,000. tal.	54	23	64	27	108
East	85	30	19	4	32
South	85	45	25	10	21
West	35	13	30	13	16
Pacific	137	113	51	123	51
United States	276	18	9	15	7
Canada	39				

## Failures by Months

	1921.	1920.	1921.	1920.	1919.
Number	1,356	547	6,228	2,678	2,978
Liabilities	\$57,066,471	\$10,826,277	\$237,464,480	\$53,752,912	\$59,228,163

## OUR FOREIGN TRADE

	1921.	1920.	1921.	1920.
Exports	\$330,000,000	\$745,523,223	\$2,197,825,942	\$5,068,910,346
Imports	\$308,000,000	\$431,004,944	\$1,138,520,319	\$3,080,408,315
Excess of exports	\$122,000,000	\$314,518,279	\$1,059,305,623	\$1,988,502,031

## Foreign and Domestic Exchange Rates

New York funds in Montreal were quoted at \$140.00/\$128.12 premium. The discount on Montreal funds in New York was from \$122.81/\$113.57. The week's rate of exchange on the principal foreign centres last week compared as follows:

Normal Rates of Exchange.		—Last Week.—		—Prev. Week.—		—Yr. to Date.—		—Same Wk., 1920.—	
	Demand.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.
4.8965—London		3.79%	3.72%	3.82%	3.73	4.00%	3.53%	3.99%	3.95%
19.28—Paris		8.23	7.97	8.27%	7.89	8.81	8.80	8.60	7.98
19.28—Belgium		8.03	7.95	8.07	7.91	8.77	6.12	8.72	8.03
19.28—Switzerland		16.98	16.84	17.06	16.65	18.00	15.22	18.21	18.14
19.28—Italy		5.07%	4.74%	5.15	4.90	5.80	3.40	6.21	6.04
40.20—Holland		33.35	32.88	33.56	32.65	36.28	31.25	35.93%	35.625
19.30—Greece		6.35	6.00	6.35	6.15	7.70	4.75	12.75	12.30
19.30—Spain		13.45	13.06	13.33	12.85	14.23	12.45	16.65	16.64
26.80—Copenhagen		17.25	16.92	17.20	16.90	20.10	15.15	16.80	16.55
26.80—Stockholm		22.35	22.25	22.45	22.10	23.83	20.05	21.90	21.80
26.80—Christiania		14.60	14.25	14.65	14.35	19.60	14.25	17.45	17.15
51.44—Russia		.26	.26	.23	.18	.07%	.18	1.92%	1.65
48.66—Bombay		25.00	24.625	25.00	25.00	29.00	24.50	39.75	38.00
48.66—Calcutta		25.00	24.625	25.00	25.00	29.00	24.50	39.75	38.00
78.00—Hongkong		50.00	50.00	50.00	49.75	59.00	44.50	75.75	70.00
108.32—Shanghai		72.50	72.00	73.00	72.40	84.50	60.00	100.00	98.00
49.83—Kobe		48.00	47.825	48.00	47.875	48.50	47.825	51.25	51.25
49.83—Yokohama		48.00	47.825	48.00	47.875	48.50	47.825	51.25	51.25
50.00—Manila		46.00	46.00	46.00	46.00	47.75	45.25	49.50	49.50
42.44—Buenos Aires		30.69	30.25	30.875	30.50	35.625	29.75	42.10	41.50
33.35—Rio		11.125	10.50	12.375	11.875	16.125	10.50	24.00	23.85
23.83—Germany		1.47	1.34	1.47%	1.38	1.85%	1.33%	2.74	2.65
20.46—Austria		.21	.17%	.22	.21	.31%	.17%	.75	.70
20.26—Jugoslavia		.71	.68%	.71	.69%	.75	.69	1.45	1.45
20.26—Czechoslovakia		1.40	1.36%	1.41	1.35%	1.60	1.14	2.60	2.60
19.30—Belgrade		2.84	2.70	2.80	2.70	3.61	2.70	6.70	6.70
19.30—Finland		1.70	1.60	1.85	1.70	3.60	1.60	4.04	4.94
19.30—Rumania		1.58	1.53%	1.54	1.47%	1.95	1.25	2.65	2.65

## Cables.

19.28—London	3.80%	3.73%	3.83	3.73%	4.01	3.54	3.99%	3.90%
19.28—Paris	8.23%	7.97%	8.28	7.80	8.81%	5.80%	8.61	7.99
19.28—Belgium	8.04	7.96	8.07%	7.92	8.78	6.13	8.73	8.04
19.28—Switzerland	17.00	16.80	17.06	16.67	18.02	15.25	18.22	18.15
19.28—Italy	5.08%	4.75%	5.15%	4.96%	5.60%	3.41	6.22	6.05
40.20—Holland	33.36	32.89	33.57	32.66	36.30	31.375	36.025	35.6875
19.30—Greece	6.40	6.30	6.40	6.30	7.75	4.80	12.80	12.35
19.30—Spain	13.46	13.00	13.34	12.86	14.25	12.46	16.80	16.69
26.80—Copenhagen	17.30	16.97	17.25	16.95	20.65	15.60	16.90	16.65
26.80—Stockholm	22.40	22.30	22.50	22.15	23.88	20.10	22.00	21.90
26.80—Christiania	14.65	14.30	14.70	14.40	19.65	14.30	17.55	17.25
51.44—Russia	.22	.17	.21	.17	.05	.17	1.95	1.80
48.66—Bombay	25.25	24.875	25.25	25.25	29.50	25.00	40.00	38.25
48.66—Calcutta	25.25	24.875	25.25	25.25	29.50	25.00	40.00	38.25
78.00—Hongkong	50.10	50.10	50.10	49.85	59.10	44.60	75.85	70.10
108.32—Shanghai	69.50	69.50	69.50	68.00	78.50	59.50	100.00	91.50
49.83—Kobe	48.25	48.25	48.25	48.125	48.75	48.00	51.50	51.50
49.83—Yokohama	48.25	48.00	48.25	48.125	48.75	48.00	51.50	51.50
50.00—Manila	46.25	46.25	46.25	46.25	48.00	45.75	49.75	49.75
42.22—Buenos Aires	30.85	30.375	31.00	30.625	35.75	29.875	42.25	41.75
33.35—Rio	11.25	10.625	12.50	12.00	16.25	10.625	24.75	24.00
23.83—Germany	1.47%	1.34%	1.48%	1.39%	1.86	1.34%	2.76	2.67
20.46—Austria	.21%	.18	.22%	.21	.32	.18	.78	.71
20.26—Jugoslavia	.71%	.69	.71%	.70	.76%	.68%	1.46	1.46
20.26—Czechoslovakia	1.40%	1.37	1.41%	1.36	1.60%	1.15	2.65	2.65
19.30—Belgrade	2.85	2.71	2.81	2.71	3.62	2.71	6.75	6.75
19.30—Finland	1.71	1.61	1.86	1.71	3.65	1.61	4.99	4.99
19.30—Rumania	1.59	1.56	1.55	1.49%	1.86	1.25%	2.70	2.70

## Cost of Money

	New York:	Last Week.	Previous Week.	Year to Date.	—Same Week—
Call loans	5 1/2%	6 1/2%	7	7	14 1/2
Time loans, 60-90 days	6	6 1/2%	7	6	15 1/2
Six months	6 1/2%	7	7 1/2	6	6
Commer. disc'ts, 4-6 mos.	6 1/2%	6 1/2%	7 1/2	6 1/2	5 1/2

## Foreign Government Securities


	Last Week.	Previous Week.	Year to Date.	—Same Week—
British Cons. 2 1/2%	46 1/4%	45 1/4%	40 3/4%	47 1/4%
British 5%	88 1/4%	87 1/4%	88 1/4%	85 1/4%
French 4 1/2%	81 1/4%	81 1/4%	81 1/4%	77 1/4%
French rentes (in Paris)	50.70/50.50	50.00/50.80	50.40/50.10	57.80/57.30
French War Loan (in Paris)	82.70	85.20/82.70	85.20/82.70	88.70/88.70

## Bar Gold and Silver

	Last Week.	Prev. Week.	Year to Date.	—Same Week—
				1920. 1919.
Bar gold in London.	110s 5d/108s 1d	110s 5d/108s 2d	115s 11d/102s 8d	104s/103s 4d 77s 9d
Bar silver in London.	35 1/2d/35d	35 1/2d/34 1/2d	42 1/2d/30 1/2d	52 1/2d/50 1/2d 54 1/2d/55 1/2d
Bar silver in N. Y.	50 1/2c/50 1/4c	50 1/4c/50c	49 1/2c/52 1/2c	93c/90c 114 1/2c/110 1/2c



## Federal Reserve Gold Holdings and Total Stock of Gold



The space between the base line and the broken line represents the cash reserves required, that between the broken line and the light line the excess reserves, or free gold, and the whole space between the base line and the heavy line represents the total stock of gold. The supply is computed monthly, so that the record can never be brought to the date of publication. The chart records the last figures published.

Week Ended Saturday, June 25				<i>Bank Clearings</i>		By Telegraph to The Annalist					
Central Reserve Cities		—Last Week—		—Year to Date—		Other Cities		—Last Week—		—Year to Date—	
1921		1920		1921		1920		1921		1920	
New York	\$3,534,127,200	\$4,411,783,153	\$7,429,471,828	\$122,097,739,508	Baltimore	\$64,770,164	\$103,708,403	\$1,019,412,161	\$2,268,087,788		
Chicago	465,745,407	629,159,287	1,688,831,704	15,931,662,488	Buffalo	35,932,580	45,365,053	867,837,433	1,076,225,433		
St. Louis	100,946,950	150,257,596	3,023,188,112	4,185,366,500	Cincinnati	72,280,533	1,391,944,482	1,731,567,050	351,199,300		
					Columbus, Ohio	11,783,500	14,534,700	330,967,000	468,503,793		
					Denver	15,653,997	29,813,733	450,501,680	2,941,707,205		
					Detroit	114,561,000	120,063,201	2,176,432,813	382,641,000		
					Indianapolis	13,682,000	18,423,000	358,795,000	1,828,502,000		
					Los Angeles	73,530,000	671,000	505,843,712	843,594,872		
					Louisville	21,743,963	26,424,212	679,752,052	1,689,312,381		
					Milwaukee	25,500,000	31,391,395	963,728,881	1,613,330,636		
					New Orleans	69,100,789	61,199,708	253,294,500	812,547,915		
					Omaha	35,741,480	35,452,597	1,060,021,427	425,978,064		
					Providence	9,020,500	12,016,100				
					St. Paul	29,818,611	8,619,802				
					Seattle	27,098,321	39,185,544				
					Washington	15,935,681	15,761,482				
Total 3 C. R. cities				\$4,098,819,557	\$5,191,200,136	\$113,141,644	\$142,214,768,497				
Decrease				21.05%		20.4%					
Other Federal Reserve cities:											
Atlanta				\$34,305,267	\$57,710,772	\$1,018,236,062	\$1,489,005,297				
Boston				266,252,089	357,729,777	6,808,316,977	9,454,856,208				
Cleveland				82,821,581	136,393,828	2,307,750,055	3,226,167,866				
Kansas City, Mo.				133,984,014	231,094,565	3,739,711,120	5,996,793,292				
Minneapolis				39,754,101	80,815,071	1,567,432,991	1,624,970,313				
Philadelphia				507,378,791	597,082,254	9,322,610,215	11,887,049,234				
Richmond				36,333,000	56,709,000	1,407,711,069	576,811,883				
San Francisco				118,500,000	155,300,000	3,189,000,000	3,874,981,983				
Total 8 cities				\$1,123,233,306	\$1,582,655,775	\$29,238,629,980	\$38,329,906,688				
Decrease				29.01%		23.7%					
Total 11 cities											
Decrease				\$5,222,052,863	\$6,773,855,011	\$142,380,121,633	\$180,544,675,185				
				22.9%		21.1%					
Total 16 cities											
Decrease				\$5,810,374,636	\$7,322,816,164	\$157,421,393,006	\$198,687,946,336				
				22.7%		20.7%					
Total 27 cities											
Decrease				\$5,810,374,636	\$7,322,816,164	\$157,421,393,006	\$198,687,946,336				
				22.7%		20.7%					



# New York Stock Exchange Transactions

Highest and lowest prices of the year are based on sales of 100 shares. Where prices are used for less than that amount they are marked with an asterisk (\*).

Week Ended June 25

Total Sales 4,808,321 Shares

Yearly Price Ranges										This Year to Date		STOCKS		Amount Capital Stock Listed		Last Dividend		Per Cent.		Last Week's Transactions		Sales	
High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	Date	Date			Date Paid	Per Cent.	Prod.	Fluct.	High	Low	Last	Change	Sales	
64	28	66	22	46	14	26	12	ADAMS EXPRESS	12,000,000	Dec. 1, '17	1	36	36	35	35	—	1%	36	36	35	—	1%	1,000
74	21	66	14	19	10	38	12	Advance Rumely	13,163,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	14	14	12	12 1/2	—	38%	38	38	38 1/2	—	3%	500
54	20	72	10	52	30	38	20	Advance Rumely pf.	11,932,900	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	38	38	38	38 1/2	—	38%	38	38	38 1/2	—	3%	500
115	86	88	32	30	11	30	21	Air Reduction (sh.)	153,630	Apr. 15, '21	\$1	31	31	31	30	30 1/2	—	31	31	30 1/2	—	3%	600
115	86	88	32	30	11	30	21	Ajax Rubber (\$50)	10,000,000	Dec. 15, '20	\$1	24	24	21 1/2	22 1/2	—	75%	24	24	21 1/2	—	2%	4,000
25 1/2	1 1/2	3	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	Alaska Gold Mines (\$10)	7,500,000	Jan. 1, '21	3	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	—	1%	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	—	1%	2,000
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Alaska Juneau G. M. (\$10)	13,967,440	Jan. 1, '21	3	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	10,000
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Allegheny & Western	3,200,000	Jan. 1, '21	3	87	87	87	87	—	1%	87	87	87	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	All-American Cables	22,991,400	Apr. 14, '21	1 1/2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Alliance Realty	2,000,000	Apr. 15, '21	1 1/2	87	87	87	87	—	1%	87	87	87	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Allied Chemical & Dye (sh.)	2,116,496	May 2, '21	\$1	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Allied Chemical & Dye pf.	30,070,900	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	87	87	87	87	—	1%	87	87	87	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Allis-Chalmers Mfg.	24,454,700	May 16, '21	1	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Allis-Chalmers Mfg. pf.	15,719,100	Apr. 15, '21	1 1/2	87	87	87	87	—	1%	87	87	87	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Amal. Sugar 1st pf.	5,000,000	May 1, '21	2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Agricultural Chemical	31,975,400	Apr. 15, '21	1 1/2	87	87	87	87	—	1%	87	87	87	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Agricultural Chem. pf.	28,453,200	Apr. 15, '21	1 1/2	87	87	87	87	—	1%	87	87	87	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Bank Note (\$50)	4,495,700	May 16, '21	\$1	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Bank Note pf. (\$50)	4,495,700	Apr. 1, '21	75c	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Beet Sugar Co.	15,000,000	Jan. 31, '21	2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Beet Sugar pf.	5,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	87	87	87	87	—	1%	87	87	87	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Bosch Magneto (sh.)	96,000	Apr. 1, '21	\$1.25	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Bosch Magneto pf.	1,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	87	87	87	87	—	1%	87	87	87	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Brake S. & E. pf. new	9,600,000	Mar. 31, '21	1 1/2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Can. Co.	41,233,300	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	87	87	87	87	—	1%	87	87	87	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Can. Co. pf.	41,233,300	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	87	87	87	87	—	1%	87	87	87	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Car & Foundry	30,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	3	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Car & Foundry pf.	30,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	87	87	87	87	—	1%	87	87	87	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Chicle (sh.)	1,100,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Cotton Oil Co.	20,267,100	June 2, '20	1	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Cotton Oil Co. pf.	10,198,600	Dec. 1, '20	3	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Drug Syndicate (\$10)	5,250,000	Dec. 15, '20	40c	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Express	18,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	\$2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Hide & Leather Co.	11,774,100	Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Hide & Leather Co. pf.	12,448,400	Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Ice pf.	14,920,000	Apr. 25, '21	1 1/2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. International	49,000,000	Sep. 30, '20	1	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. La F. Fire Eng. (\$10)	2,110,000	May 16, '21	25c	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Linsed Co.	16,750,000	Mar. 31, '21	1 1/2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Linsed Co. pf.	16,750,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Locomotive Co.	25,000,000	Mar. 31, '21	1 1/2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Locomotive pf.	25,000,000	Mar. 31, '21	1 1/2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Malt & Grain, stamped	5,000,000	Mar. 31, '21	1 1/2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Malt & Grain (sh.)	5,000,000	Mar. 31, '21	1 1/2	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Radiator (\$25)	13,806,225	Mar. 31, '21	\$1	100	100	100	100	—	1%	100	100	100	—	1%	100
100	87	105	87	105	87	100	87	Am. Radiator pf.	3,000,000	May 16, '21													



## New York Stock Exchange Transactions—Continued

Yearly Price Ranges				This Year to Date				STOCKS		Amount		Last Dividend		Last Week's Transactions					
High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Stock	Capital	Stock	Capital	Date	Per Cent.	First	High.	Low.	Last	Change	Sales
82	57	72 1/2	58	63	Jan. 6	70	June 23	Chl. St. P. Minn. & O.	18,556,700	Feb. 21, '21	2 1/2	SA	50	50	50	50	50	- 3/4	500
167	98	125 1/2	86	125	Feb. 10	7	June 23	Chl. St. P. Minn. & O. pf.	11,250,300	Feb. 21, '21	2 1/2	SA	100	100	100	100	100	- 1/4	14,700
20 1/2	16 1/2	21 1/2	15 1/2	21 1/2	Mar. 9	19 1/2	Mar. 20	Chile Copper (\$25)	95,000,000	Sep. 30, '20	37 1/2	Q	23 1/2	23 1/2	23 1/2	23 1/2	23 1/2	- 1/4	9,800
56 1/2	32 1/2	41 1/2	16 1/2	27 1/2	May 11	19 1/2	Mar. 20	Chino Copper (\$5)	4,349,900	Sep. 30, '20	37 1/2	Q	23 1/2	23 1/2	23 1/2	23 1/2	23 1/2	- 1/4	800
54 1/2	32	62	31 1/2	48	Jan. 20	32	June 23	Cleve. C. C. & St. Louis	47,650,300	Sep. 1, '10	2	SA	35	35	35	34	35	- 1/2	100
74	63	69	60	66	Mar. 3	60	Feb. 3	Cleveland, C. C. & St. Louis pf.	9,988,900	Apr. 28, '21	1 1/2	Q	60	60	60	61	60	- 1/2	100
69 1/2	67	69	58 1/2	69	Jan. 10	69	June 23	Cleveland & Pittsburgh (\$50)	11,387,750	June 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	39 1/2	39 1/2	39 1/2	39 1/2	39 1/2	- 3/4	200
108	80 1/2	106	40 1/2	86	Jan. 13	79 1/2	Apr. 4	Cluett, Peabody & Co.	18,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	25 1/2	25 1/2	25 1/2	25 1/2	25 1/2	- 1/4	42,000
110	103 1/2	104	80	101	Apr. 29	19	Feb. 24	Coca-Cola (sh.)	455,543	July 15, '20	1 1/2	Q	25 1/2	25 1/2	25 1/2	25 1/2	25 1/2	- 1/4	2,100
43 1/2	37 1/2	40 1/2	18	31 1/2	May 6	25 1/2	June 13	Colorado Fuel & Iron	34,235,500	May 25, '21	2 1/2	Q	31	31	31	31	31	- 1/4	1,800
56	34 1/2	44 1/2	22	32 1/2	May 6	25 1/2	June 13	Colorado Fuel & Iron pf.	2,000,000	May 25, '21	2 1/2	Q	31	31	31	31	31	- 1/4	100
120	101 1/2	105	97 1/2	100	Apr. 11	100	Apr. 11	Colorado & Southern	31,000,000	Dec. 31, '20	2	SA	43	43	43	43	43	- 3 1/2	1,800
31 1/2	19	36 1/2	20	30 1/2	May 6	27 1/2	Jan. 8	Colorado & Southern 1st pf.	8,500,000	Dec. 31, '20	2	SA	43	43	43	43	43	- 2	100
58 1/2	48	48	40	43 1/2	Apr. 28	49	Jan. 3	Colorado & Southern 2d pf.	8,500,000	Dec. 31, '20	2	SA	43	43	43	43	43	- 2	100
51 1/2	45	47	35	46 1/2	Mar. 8	42	Jan. 26	Columbia Gas & Electric	50,000,000	May 16, '21	1 1/2	Q	55 1/2	55 1/2	55 1/2	55 1/2	55 1/2	- 1 1/2	7,000
60	39 1/2	67	50	63	Jan. 29	52	June 20	Columbia Gas & Electric pf.	1,311,892	Jan. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	55 1/2	55 1/2	55 1/2	55 1/2	55 1/2	- 1 1/2	2,000
75 1/2	50 1/2	65 1/2	39 1/2	72 1/2	Jan. 8	4 1/2	June 23	Columbia Graph. (sh.)	10,581,500	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	55 1/2	55 1/2	55 1/2	55 1/2	55 1/2	- 1 1/2	2,000
93 1/2	91 1/2	92 1/2	52 1/2	92 1/2	Feb. 10	18 1/2	June 23	Columbia Graph. pf.	10,581,500	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	55 1/2	55 1/2	55 1/2	55 1/2	55 1/2	- 1 1/2	2,000
65 1/2	37 1/2	56	26	34	May 9	26	June 23	Comp. Tab. Rec. (sh.)	131,033	Apr. 11, '21	1 1/2	Q	24	24	24	24	24	- 1 1/2	1,500
75	34	79 1/2	31 1/2	61	Jan. 13	21 1/2	June 24	Consolidated Cigar (sh.)	103,500	Apr. 15, '21	1 1/2	Q	24	24	24	24	24	- 1 1/2	1,500
80 1/2	78	89 1/2	70	80	Feb. 18	65	Apr. 19	Consolidated Cigar pf.	4,000,000	June 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	65	65	65	65	65	- 1	100
100 1/2	78 1/2	93 1/2	71 1/2	91 1/2	May 17	77 1/2	Jan. 5	Consol. Distributors	189,789	Jan. 21, '21	1 1/2	Q	84	84	84	84	84	- 1	3,200
94	78 1/2	85	65	84 1/2	Apr. 29	84 1/2	Apr. 29	Consolidated Food	100,394,500	Jan. 15, '21	1 1/2	Q	84	84	84	84	84	- 1	3,200
37 1/2	30 1/2	36 1/2	16	31 1/2	Jan. 7	15 1/2	June 24	Consolidated Textile (sh.)	267,355	Jan. 15, '21	75c	Q	17 1/2	17 1/2	17 1/2	17 1/2	17 1/2	- 1 1/2	3,000
100 1/2	65 1/2	97 1/2	41 1/2	98	Jan. 20	42	Apr. 6	Continental Can Co.	13,500,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	45	45	45	45	45	- 1 1/2	700
110	100 1/2	102 1/2	97 1/2	98	Jan. 6	90	Apr. 4	Continental Can Co. pf.	4,435,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	45	45	45	45	45	- 1 1/2	4,000
10	10 1/2	14 1/2	3 1/2	5	Jan. 7	1	Feb. 15	Continental Candy (sh.)	500,000	Oct. 20, '20	25c	SA	1	1	1	1	1	- 1 1/2	1,000
84 1/2	58	83	63 1/2	65 1/2	Jan. 26	61	Mar. 15	Continental Insur. Co. (\$25)	49,784,000	Apr. 20, '21	1 1/2	Q	61 1/2	61 1/2	61 1/2	61 1/2	61 1/2	- 1 1/2	49,300
95	146	163 1/2	61	136	Jan. 3	50	June 20	Corn Products Refining Co.	29,827,000	Apr. 20, '21	1 1/2	Q	99	99	99	99	99	- 1 1/2	200
109 1/2	102	107	97 1/2	104 1/2	Jan. 17	96	June 15	Corn Products Refining Co. pf.	29,827,000	Apr. 15, '21	1 1/2	Q	99	99	99	99	99	- 1 1/2	37,000
70	48	64	45 1/2	49 1/2	May 11	33 1/2	June 7	Crex Carpet Co.	2,098,500	June 15, '21	1 1/2	SA	54 1/2	54 1/2	54 1/2	54 1/2	54 1/2	- 1 1/2	91,300
201	52 1/2	278 1/2	70	107 1/2	Jan. 11	51 1/2	June 23	Cruible Steel Co.	37,500,000	Apr. 30, '21	2 1/2	Q	82	82	82	82	82	- 1 1/2	1,000
105	91	100	81 1/2	91	Jan. 17	82	June 16	Cruible Steel Co. pf.	12,481,000	Mar. 31, '21	1 1/2	Q	15	15	15	15	15	- 1 1/2	9,800
105 1/2	91 1/2	100	81 1/2	91	Jan. 17	82	June 16	Cruible Steel Co. pf.	12,481,000	Mar. 31, '21	1 1/2	Q	15	15	15	15	15	- 1 1/2	100
105 1/2	91 1/2	100	81 1/2	91	Jan. 17	82	June 16	Cruible Steel Co. pf.	12,481,000	Mar. 31, '21	1 1/2	Q	15	15	15	15	15	- 1 1/2	21,000
87 1/2	60 1/2	85 1/2	34	67 1/2	Feb. 18	25	June 22	Cuba Cane Sugar pf.	50,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	29	29	29	29	29	- 2 1/2	18,000
103	93 1/2	101	82	103	May 11	90	Apr. 1	DAVISON CHEMICAL (sh.)	197,300	Nov. 15, '20	81	Q	35	35	35	35	35	- 3/4	1,300
116	91 1/2	108	83 1/2	103	May 11	90	Apr. 1	De Beers Con. M. (sh.)	62,900	Jan. 27, '21	75c	Q	14	14	14	14	14	- 3/4	1,000
217	172 1/2	260 1/2	165	240	May 16	176	June 20	Deere & Co. pf.	37,828,500	June 20, '21	2 1/2	Q	177 1/2	177 1/2	177 1/2	177 1/2	177 1/2	- 1 1/2	1,700
15 1/2	9 1/2	16 1/2	4 1/2	14	Jan. 29	8	May 13	Delaware & Hudson	42,503,000	June 20, '21	2 1/2	Q	177 1/2	177 1/2	177 1/2	177 1/2	177 1/2	- 1 1/2	2,600
24	6 1/2	16 1/2	4 1/2	14	Jan. 29	8	May 13	Delaware & Hudson pf.	38,000,000	Jan. 15, '21	2 1/2	Q	177 1/2	177 1/2	177 1/2	177 1/2	177 1/2	- 1 1/2	2,600
120	110	108	96 1/2	96	May 13	96	May 13	Delaware & Hudson pf.	38,000,000	Apr. 15, '21	2 1/2	Q	177 1/2	177 1/2	177 1/2	177 1/2	177 1/2	- 1 1/2	2,600
105	80	101	83 1/2	95	May 12	86 1/2	Apr. 28	Detroit United Railway	15,000,000	Apr. 20, '21	2 1/2	Q	17 1/2	17 1/2	17 1/2	17 1/2	17 1/2	- 1 1/2	10,200
16 1/2	10 1/2	15	9 1/2	21 1/2	Apr. 21	10 1/2	Apr. 3	Duluth-Superior Traction	4,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	5	5	5	5	5	- 1 1/2	2,400
6 1/2	4 1/2	5 1/2	3 1/2	4 1/2	Jan. 3	2 1/2	Feb. 23	Duluth-Superior Traction pf.	1,500,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	5	5	5	5	5	- 1 1/2	300



*New York Stock Exchange Transactions—Continued*

[illegible]



## New York Stock Exchange Transactions—Continued

Yearly Price Ranges.										This Year to Date.		STOCKS.		Amount.		Last Dividend.		Last Week's Transactions.													
1919.		1920.		High.		Low.		High.		Low.		Date.		Capital Stock Listed.		Paid.		Per Cent.		First.		High.		Low.		Last.		Change.		Sales.	
74 1/2	44 1/2	55 1/2	16 1/2	24 1/2	Jan. 25	12 1/2	June 23	100,000	May 15, '20	\$1	13	14	12 1/2	12 1/2	—	1	1,200														
121	84	122 1/2	49 1/2	48	Mar. 11	40 1/2	Mar. 10	100,000	Jan. 1, '21	1 1/2	50 1/2	51 1/2	40 1/2	48	—	1	1,200														
18	17	24 1/2	24 1/2	46 1/2	May 5	46 1/2	June 20	2,250,000	Feb. 15, '21	\$1.65	50 1/2	51 1/2	40 1/2	48	—	1	1,200														
17	12 1/2	17 1/2	10	13	Jan. 12	10 1/2	June 13	14,084,692	June 20, '21	25c	Q	10 1/2	11	10 1/2	—	1	1,200														
27 1/2	10 1/2	33 1/2	15 1/2	25 1/2	Mar. 28	19 1/2	June 23	46,432,000	June 20, '21	25c	Q	10 1/2	11	10 1/2	—	1	1,200														
37	20	48 1/2	23 1/2	35 1/2	May 10	27 1/2	June 23	7,500,000	June 20, '21	25c	Q	10 1/2	11	10 1/2	—	1	1,200														
25	10 1/2	40	11	30 1/2	May 9	19 1/2	June 23	16,856,200	June 20, '21	25c	Q	10 1/2	11	10 1/2	—	1	1,200														
37 1/2	23	43 1/2	20 1/2	30 1/2	Jan. 13	28	June 24	19,803,700	June 20, '21	25c	Q	10 1/2	11	10 1/2	—	1	1,200														
94 1/2	53 1/2	83 1/2	29 1/2	31 1/2	Feb. 16	2	June 23	105,000	Nov. 1, '20	25c	Q	10 1/2	11	10 1/2	—	1	1,200														
29	6 1/2	21 1/2	2 1/2	6 1/2	Apr. 30	2 1/2	Jan. 3	9,239,300	Sep. 15, '20	1 1/2	10	10	9 1/2	9 1/2	—	1	1,200														
12	11 1/2	11 1/2	5 1/2	7 1/2	May 9	5 1/2	Apr. 16	187,000	Apr. 10, '17	1 1/2	10	10	9 1/2	9 1/2	—	1	1,200														
23 1/2	12	20 1/2	8 1/2	12 1/2	May 10	8 1/2	Mar. 11	21,355,300	Aug. 15, '14	1 1/2	10	10	9 1/2	9 1/2	—	1	1,200														
230 1/2	108 1/2	243	85 1/2	168 1/2	Jan. 3	63 1/2	June 23	12,715,900	Feb. 15, '21	1 1/2	71	72	63 1/2	71	—	1	1,200														
129	115 1/2	110 1/2	98 1/2	104	Jan. 17	123	Mar. 11	105,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	14 1/2	13 1/2	10 1/2	—	1	1,200														
19 1/2	10	13	4	7 1/2	May 18	4 1/2	Jan. 3	8,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	14 1/2	13 1/2	10 1/2	—	1	1,200														
80 1/2	74	90 1/2	33 1/2	49	May 9	38 1/2	Feb. 3	200,000	Jan. 27, '21	72 1/2	41 1/2	41 1/2	38 1/2	40	—	1	1,200														
64 1/2	41 1/2	48 1/2	20	28 1/2	May 6	17 1/2	June 20	3,881,631	Jan. 27, '21	72 1/2	41 1/2	41 1/2	38 1/2	40	—	1	1,200														
89	40 1/2	82 1/2	43	56	Jan. 11	32 1/2	June 23	10,000,000	Feb. 10, '21	1 1/2	Q	35	35	32 1/2	—	1	1,200														
97 1/2	85	94 1/2	73 1/2	79	Feb. 28	70	June 10	6,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	38	38	37 1/2	—	1	1,200														
257 1/2	132	310	70	163	Jan. 31	35	June 23	5,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	38	38	37 1/2	—	1	1,200														
117	107	116	103	103	Apr. 26	103	Apr. 26	302,087,400	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	71	72	67 1/2	—	1	1,200														
115	97 1/2	113 1/2	80 1/2	101	Jan. 3	67 1/2	June 21	1,047,300	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	71	72	67 1/2	—	1	1,200														
22	20 1/2	23 1/2	18	24 1/2	Jan. 13	17 1/2	June 20	94,599,300	Dec. 30, '20	2 1/2	SA	42	44 1/2	42	—	1	1,200														
72 1/2	52 1/2	66 1/2	30	60	Jan. 13	42	June 21	58,758,100	Dec. 30, '20	2 1/2	SA	42	44 1/2	42	—	1	1,200														
750	356	515 1/2	51 1/2	68	June 24	67 1/2	June 23	5,740,200	Dec. 30, '20	2 1/2	SA	42	44 1/2	42	—	1	1,200														
100	124	100	100	111	Apr. 5	95 1/2	May 24	90,373,311	Dec. 30, '20	2 1/2	SA	42	44 1/2	42	—	1	1,200														
94 1/2	85 1/2	85	77 1/2	78	Jan. 12	75	June 18	3,399,000	May 31, '21	2	Q	10	10	10	—	1	1,200														
157 1/2	144	167 1/2	107	110	Jan. 13	124 1/2	June 13	6,488,300	May 31, '21	2	Q	10	10	10	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	98,338,300	Mar. 15, '21	1 1/2	Q	127	135	127	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	196,676,690	Mar. 15, '21	1 1/2	Q	127	135	127	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	17,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	127	135	127	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	3,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	127	135	127	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	433,322	May 15, '21	50c	Q	22 1/2	23 1/2	22 1/2	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	74,926	Jan. 3, '21	50c	Q	22 1/2	23 1/2	22 1/2	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	69,000,000	June 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	74 1/2	74 1/2	73 1/2	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	10,200,000	June 1, '21	1 1/2	Q	92	92	92	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	765,900	June 1, '21	1 1/2	SA	50 1/2	50 1/2	50 1/2	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	3,882,813	Dec. 20, '20	50c	Q	50 1/2	50 1/2	50 1/2	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	6,000,000	May 2, '21	1 1/2	Q	20	20	20	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	2,379,300	May 16, '21	2	Q	20	20	20	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	137,000	Oct. 5, '20	81	10	10	10	10	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	703,685	Oct. 5, '20	81	10	10	10	10	—	1	1,200														
113 1/2	100	110	100	110	Jan. 13	100	June 13	130,982,000	Mar. 31																						



Range, 1921				Range, 1921				Range, 1921				Range, 1921			
High	Low	Last	Net	High	Low	Last	Net	High	Low	Last	Net	High	Low	Last	Net
92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2
ADAMS EXP. Co.	59	59	59	ADAMS EXP. Co.	59	59	59	ADAMS EXP. Co.	59	59	59	ADAMS EXP. Co.	59	59	59
Alaska G. M. ex. 6s.	111 1/2	111 1/2	111 1/2	Alaska G. M. ex. 6s.	111 1/2	111 1/2	111 1/2	Alaska G. M. ex. 6s.	111 1/2	111 1/2	111 1/2	Alaska G. M. ex. 6s.	111 1/2	111 1/2	111 1/2
Am. Ag. Chem. 7 1/2s.	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	Am. Ag. Chem. 7 1/2s.	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	Am. Ag. Chem. 7 1/2s.	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	Am. Ag. Chem. 7 1/2s.	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2
Am. Ag. Chem. 5s.	92	92	92	Am. Ag. Chem. 5s.	92	92	92	Am. Ag. Chem. 5s.	92	92	92	Am. Ag. Chem. 5s.	92	92	92
Am. S. & H. 1st 3s.	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2	Am. S. & H. 1st 3s.	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2	Am. S. & H. 1st 3s.	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2	Am. S. & H. 1st 3s.	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2
Am. T. & T. ex. 6s.	97 1/2	97 1/2	97 1/2	Am. T. & T. ex. 6s.	97 1/2	97 1/2	97 1/2	Am. T. & T. ex. 6s.	97 1/2	97 1/2	97 1/2	Am. T. & T. ex. 6s.	97 1/2	97 1/2	97 1/2
Am. T. & T. col. 5s.	82 1/2	82 1/2	82 1/2	Am. T. & T. col. 5s.	82 1/2	82 1/2	82 1/2	Am. T. & T. col. 5s.	82 1/2	82 1/2	82 1/2	Am. T. & T. col. 5s.	82 1/2	82 1/2	82 1/2
Am. T. & T. ex. 4s.	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	Am. T. & T. ex. 4s.	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	Am. T. & T. ex. 4s.	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	Am. T. & T. ex. 4s.	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2
Am. T. & T. col. 4s.	78 1/2	78 1/2	78 1/2	Am. T. & T. col. 4s.	78 1/2	78 1/2	78 1/2	Am. T. & T. col. 4s.	78 1/2	78 1/2	78 1/2	Am. T. & T. col. 4s.	78 1/2	78 1/2	78 1/2
Am. Writing P. 7s.	71 1/2	71 1/2	71 1/2	Am. Writing P. 7s.	71 1/2	71 1/2	71 1/2	Am. Writing P. 7s.	71 1/2	71 1/2	71 1/2	Am. Writing P. 7s.	71 1/2	71 1/2	71 1/2
Armour & Co. 4 1/2s.	78 1/2	78 1/2	78 1/2	Armour & Co. 4 1/2s.	78 1/2	78 1/2	78 1/2	Armour & Co. 4 1/2s.	78 1/2	78 1/2	78 1/2	Armour & Co. 4 1/2s.	78 1/2	78 1/2	78 1/2
A. T. & S. P. gen. 4s.	75 1/2	75 1/2	75 1/2	A. T. & S. P. gen. 4s.	75 1/2	75 1/2	75 1/2	A. T. & S. P. gen. 4s.	75 1/2	75 1/2	75 1/2	A. T. & S. P. gen. 4s.	75 1/2	75 1/2	75 1/2
A. T. & S. P. adj. 4s.	67 1/2	67 1/2	67 1/2	A. T. & S. P. adj. 4s.	67 1/2	67 1/2	67 1/2	A. T. & S. P. adj. 4s.	67 1/2	67 1/2	67 1/2	A. T. & S. P. adj. 4s.	67 1/2	67 1/2	67 1/2
A. T. & S. P. adj. 4s.	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	A. T. & S. P. adj. 4s.	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	A. T. & S. P. adj. 4s.	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	A. T. & S. P. adj. 4s.	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2
A. T. & S. P. adj. 4s.	69 1/2	69 1/2	69 1/2	A. T. & S. P. adj. 4s.	69 1/2	69 1/2	69 1/2	A. T. & S. P. adj. 4s.	69 1/2	69 1/2	69 1/2	A. T. & S. P. adj. 4s.	69 1/2	69 1/2	69 1/2
At. & Ch. A. L. 1st 5s.	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	At. & Ch. A. L. 1st 5s.	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	At. & Ch. A. L. 1st 5s.	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	At. & Ch. A. L. 1st 5s.	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2
At. Coast Line 7s.	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2	At. Coast Line 7s.	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2	At. Coast Line 7s.	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2	At. Coast Line 7s.	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2
At. C. L. 1st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 1st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 1st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 1st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 2d 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 2d 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 2d 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 2d 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 3d 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 3d 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 3d 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 3d 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 4th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 4th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 4th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 4th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 5th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 5th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 5th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 5th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 6th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 6th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 6th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 6th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 7th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 7th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 7th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 7th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 8th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 8th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 8th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 8th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 9th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 9th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 9th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 9th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 10th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 10th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 10th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 10th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 11th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 11th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 11th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 11th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 12th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 12th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 12th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 12th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 13th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 13th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 13th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 13th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 14th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 14th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 14th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 14th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 15th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 15th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 15th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 15th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 16th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 16th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 16th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 16th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 17th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 17th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 17th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 17th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 18th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 18th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 18th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 18th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 19th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 19th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 19th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 19th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 20th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 20th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 20th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 20th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 21st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 21st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 21st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 21st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 22nd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 22nd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 22nd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 22nd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 23rd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 23rd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 23rd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 23rd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 24th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 24th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 24th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 24th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 25th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 25th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 25th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 25th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 26th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 26th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 26th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 26th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 27th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 27th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 27th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 27th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 28th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 28th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 28th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 28th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 29th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 29th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 29th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 29th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 30th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 30th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 30th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 30th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 31st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 31st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 31st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 31st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 32nd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 32nd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 32nd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 32nd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 33rd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 33rd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 33rd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 33rd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 34th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 34th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 34th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 34th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 35th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 35th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 35th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 35th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 36th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 36th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 36th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 36th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 37th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 37th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 37th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 37th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 38th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 38th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 38th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 38th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 39th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 39th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 39th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 39th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 40th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 40th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 40th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 40th 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 41st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 41st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 41st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 41st 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2
At. C. L. 42nd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	At. C. L. 42nd 4s.	74 1/2	74 1/2	74								







## ADVERTISEMENTS.

**C. F. CHILDS & Co.**

SPECIALISTS IN UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT BONDS  
120 Broadway 208 So. La Salle St.  
NEW YORK CHICAGO

**Victory  
NOTES**

The Oldest House in America  
Specializing Exclusively in  
Government Bonds

**ROBINSON & Co.**

U. S. Government Bonds  
Investment Securities

26 Exchange Place New York  
Members New York Stock Exchange.

Canadian  
Government, Municipal and  
Corporation  
Securities

**A. E. AMES & CO.**

Established 1889  
74 Broadway  
Toronto NEW YORK Montreal  
Telephone 8045-6 Rector

Winchester Rptg. Arms, 7 1/2, 1941  
Northern Ontario Lt. & Pr. 6s, 1931  
Lukens Steel 8s, 1940  
Cons. Cities Lt., Pr. & Traction  
5s, 1962

**McCown & Co.**

Land Title Bldg., Philadelphia, Pa.  
Members Philadelphia Stock Exchange

**"BOND TOPICS"**

Our monthly free on request for Booklet &

**A. H. Bickmore & Co.**

111 Broadway, New York

Lawrence Chamberlain & Co.  
Incorporated

115 Broadway New York

American Light & Traction  
Pacific Gas & Electric  
Western Power  
Central Petroleum

**MacQuoid & Coady**

Members New York Stock Exchange  
14 Wall St., New York. Tel. Rector 9970.

**W. G. Souders & Co.**

Investment Securities

31 Nassau St., New York

Chicago Grand Rapids  
Detroit Milwaukee

Pacific Gas & Elec. 1st Pfd.  
Dayton Power & Light Com. & Pfd.  
Rio de Janeiro Tram., Lt. & P. 1st 5s, 1935

**John Nickerson, Jr.**

61 Broadway, New York  
Telephone Bowling Green 6840.

**M. S. Wolfe & Co.**

Specialists in

Independent Oils

41 Broad St. Phone 25 Broad New York

## ADVERTISEMENTS

**Open Security Market**

Advertisements of quotations on unlisted securities are accepted only from dealers and brokers of recognized standing. They are as of the Friday before publication—the last full day of the financial week. Changes occurring on Saturday will be reflected at the opening of the market on Monday, so that these quotations are subject to alteration. Address Advertising Department, The Open Market, The Annalist, 2 Rector Street, New York City.

**Bonds****Bonds****UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES**

	Bid	Offered		
Consol. 2s, April, 1930.....	100%	100%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway.	Rector 6731.
Old 4s, 1925.....	100%	100%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway.	Rector 6731.
Panama 2s, 1930-1935.....	100%	100%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway.	Rector 6731.
Do 3s, 1961.....	76	78	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway.	Rector 6731.
Liberty 3 1/2s, 1932-47.....	87.80	87.86	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway.	Rector 6731.
Do 1st 4s, 1932-47.....	87.30	87.50	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway.	Rector 6731.
Do 2d 4s, 1932-47.....	86.80	86.74	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway.	Rector 6731.
Do 1st 4 1/2s, 1932-47.....	87.40	87.46	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway.	Rector 6731.
Do 2d 4 1/2s, 1932-47.....	86.72	86.74	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway.	Rector 6731.
Do 3d 4 1/2s, Sept. 15, 1928.....	91.34	91.38	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway.	Rector 6731.
Do 4th 4 1/2s, 1933-38.....	86.86	86.90	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway.	Rector 6731.
Victory 3 1/2s, 1922-23.....	98.38	98.40	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway.	Rector 6731.
Do 4 1/2s, 1922-23.....	98.38	98.40	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway.	Rector 6731.

**CANADIAN SECURITIES**

Canadian War Loan 5s, 1937.....	87	85 1/2	Henry Nightingale & Co., 42 Broadway.	Broad 7118.
Canadian Victory Loan 5 1/2s, '34	82	83 1/2	Henry Nightingale & Co., 42 Broadway.	Broad 7118.
Dominion of Can. 5 1/2s, 1922.....	87 1/2	89	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 1922.....	86 1/2	88 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 1925.....	85 1/2	85 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 1927.....	86 1/2	88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 5s, 1931.....	82	84	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 5 1/2s, 1933.....	86	88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 5 1/2s, 1937.....	87 1/2	89	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 5 1/2s, 1924.....	85 1/2	86 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 5 1/2s, 1934.....	83 1/2	85 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.

**OTHER FOREIGN, INCLUDING NOTES****GERMAN MUNICIPAL ISSUES:**

Berlin 4s.....	11 1/2	11 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Bremen 4 1/2s.....	13	14 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Cologne 4s.....	13	13 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Coblenz 4s.....	13	15	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Danzig 4s.....	14	18	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Dresden 4s.....	12 1/2	13 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Dresden 4 1/2s.....	12 1/2	13 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Düsseldorf 4s.....	11 1/2	13 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Essen 4s.....	11 1/2	13 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Frankfurt 4s.....	13 1/2	14 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Frankfurt 5s.....	14 1/2	16	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Greater Berlin 4s.....	11 1/2	12 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Hamburg 4s.....	14	16	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Hamburg 4 1/2s.....	13 1/2	15 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Leipzig 4s.....	12 1/2	13 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Leipzig 4 1/2s.....	13	14	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Leipzig 5s.....	14	14 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Mannheim 4s.....	11	12 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Munich 4s.....	13	14	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Munich 5s.....	14	16	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Nuremberg 4s.....	13	14	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Stuttgart 4s.....	12 1/2	13 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.

**GERMAN INDUSTRIAL ISSUES:**

German General Electric 4 1/2s.....	14 1/2	15 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Badische Anilin Soda 4 1/2s.....	15 1/2	17	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.

**GERMAN GOVERNMENT ISSUES:**

German Government 3s.....	10	12	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
German Government 4s.....	11	12	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
German Government 5s.....	10 1/2	11 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.

**FRENCH GOVERNMENT BONDS:**

French 4s, 1917.....	40	40 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
French 4s, 1918.....	46	50	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Do 4s, 1920.....	61 1/2	62	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Do Victory 5s, 1931.....	70 1/2	71	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Do 4s, 1917.....	50	50 1/2	Henry Nightingale & Co., 42 Broadway.	Broad 7118.
French Govt. 4s, 1917.....	45	47	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do Victory 5s (optional) 1931.....	64	65	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do Prem. 5s, 1920.....	72 1/2	73 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 5s, 1920-25.....	61 1/2	62 1/2	Fitzgerald & Harte, 170 Broadway.	Cort. 6900.
Do 4s, 1917.....	70	71	Fitzgerald & Harte, 170 Broadway.	Cort. 6900.
Do 4s, 1918.....	49	49 1/2	Fitzgerald & Harte, 170 Broadway.	Cort. 6900.
Do 4s, 1918.....	48	52	Fitzgerald & Harte, 170 Broadway.	Cort. 6900.
Do 6s, 1920.....	71	72	Fitzgerald & Harte, 170 Broadway.	Cort. 6900.

**MEXICAN ISSUES:**

Mexican Govt. 5s, 1946.....	44 1/2	46	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
-----------------------------	--------	----	------------------------------	-------------

**BELGIAN GOVERNMENT BONDS:**

Belgian Restoration 6s, 1919.....	66	69	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920.....	69	72	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Belgian Int. Rest. 5s, 1919.....	67	70	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do Prem. 5s, 1920.....	70	73	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Belgian External 6s.....	91 1/2	92 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.

**ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ISSUES:**

Italian 5s, 1918.....	38	38 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Do 5s, 1918.....	38 1/2	39 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Italian 5s, 1920.....	38	38 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Italian Treasury Notes, 1923.....	45 1/2	46 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Do 5s, 1925.....	48	50	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 5s, 1925.....	38 1/2	39 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Italian Consol. 5s, 1918.....	38	38 1/2	Fitzgerald & Harte, 170 Broadway.	Cort. 6900.
Do Treas. Notes 5s.....	45 1/2	46 1/2	Fitzgerald & Harte, 170 Broadway.	Cort. 6900.

**AUSTRIAN MUNICIPAL ISSUES:**

Vienna 4s.....	1 1/2	2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Vienna 4 1/2s.....	1 1/2	2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Vienna 5s.....	1 1/2	2 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.

**POLISH ISSUES:**

Polish Lib. Loan 6s, 1940.....	65	70	Henry Nightingale & Co., 42 Broadway.	Broad 7118.
--------------------------------	----	----	---------------------------------------	-------------

**BRITISH ISSUES:**

British Victory 4s.....	283	283	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
British Funding 4s.....	262	272	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
British 5s, 1922.....	374	384	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
British consol. 2 1/2s.....	176	186	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
British Victory 4 1/2s.....	283	283	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
British Funding 4 1/2s.....	268	278	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
British 5 1/2s War Loan, 1920-1947.....	324	334	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
British 5 1/2s Nat. War Bonds, '22.....	377	387	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
British 5s, 1927.....	363	373	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
British 5s, 1929.....	363	373	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
British 5s, 1929-47.....	322	332	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
British 5 1/2s Nat. War Bonds, '27.....	368	378	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
British 5 1/2s Nat. War Bonds, '29.....	368	378	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.

**RUSSIAN ISSUES:**

Russian (Gold Loan) 5 1/2s, 1921.....	13 1/2	14 1/2	Henry Nightingale & Co., 42 Broadway.	Broad 7118.
Russian 5 1/2s, 1921.....	4	5	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 6 1/2s, 1919.....	13	17	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.

**JAPANESE ISSUES:**

Japanese 4s, 1931.....	69	69 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Japanese 4s, 1931 (420 pieces).....	68 1/2	69 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Japanese 1st Series 4 1/2s, 1925.....	84 1/2	85	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Japanese 2d Series 4 1/2s, 1925.....	84 1/2	85	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Jap. 2d Ser. 4 1/2s, 25 (420 pieces).....	69 1/2	70 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Japanese Govt. 4, 1931.....	69 1/2	70 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 4s, 1931 (420 pieces).....	68 1/2	69 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 1st 4 1/2s, 1925.....	84 1/2	85 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 2d 4 1/2s, 1925.....	84 1/2	85 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 2d 4 1/2s, 1925 (420 pieces).....	84 1/2	85 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Japanese Government 5s, 1907.....	57 1/2	57 1/2	Maxwell B. Smith, 16 Exchange Place.	B. G. 4697.
Japanese Govt. 5s, 1913-23.....	87 1/2	88 1/2	Maxwell B. Smith, 16 Exchange Place.	B. G. 4697.

**CHINESE ISSUES:**

Chinese Hukwang Ry. 5s, 1951	42	44	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
(420 pieces).....	43	47	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Do 5s, 1951.....	44	45	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 5s, 1951.....	44	45	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Chinese Reorg. 5s, 1913-60.....	46 1/2	48 1/2	Maxwell B. Smith, 16 Exchange Place.	B. G. 4697.
Do.....	47 1/2	49 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.

**BRAZILIAN ISSUES:**

Brazil 4s, 1890.....	33	34	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do Recession 4s.....	33	35	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Brazil 4s, 1890.....	32 1/2	33 1/2	Maxwell B. Smith, 16 Exchange Place.	B. G. 4697.
Brazil 5s, 1895.....	32 1/2	33 1/2	Maxwell B. Smith, 16 Exchange Place.	B. G. 4697.
Brazil 4s, 1890.....	32 1/2	33 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Do 1910.....	31 1/2	32 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Do 4s, 1890.....	32 1/2	33 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.
Do 5s, 1895.....	32 1/2	33 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Place.	Hanover 8300.

## ADVERTISEMENTS.

Dealers in  
**Cuban & Canadian  
Government  
Municipal  
R. R. & Corporation  
Bonds**

**MILLER & CO.**

Members New York Stock Exchange  
120 Broadway New York

**CANADIAN**



## ADVERTISEMENTS



Dividends Declared,  
Awaiting Payment

Continued from Preceding Page

Company	Rate	Pay- able	Books Close
Utraz. Tr. & P. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
Boston Elevated	1/8	Q	July 1
Do pf.	1/8	Q	July 1
Capt. Tr. (Wash., D.C.)	1/8	Q	July 1
Carolina P. & L. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 17
Cin. & Hamilton Trac.	1/8	Q	July 1
Do pf.	1/8	Q	July 1
Cincinnati Street Ry.	1/8	Q	July 1
City Ry. (Dayton, Ohio)	1/8	Q	July 1
Com. & P. pf. 1/2	Q	June 30	June 15
Columbus (Ga.) El. pf. 3/8	Q	July 1	June 15
Cont. Pass. Ry. Phila.	3/8	Q	June 30
Conestoga Trac.	1/8	Q	June 30
Con. El. & P. (N.O.) pf. 1/2	Q	June 30	June 9
Duquesne Light pf. 1/2	Q	Aug. 1	July 1
Eastern Texas Elec.	2	Q	July 1
Do pf.	2	Q	July 1
Elmira W. L. & R. R.	1/8	Q	June 30
1st pf.	1/8	Q	June 30
2d pf.	1/8	Q	June 30
El Paso Electric pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
El. & P. & R. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
Illinois Traction pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
K. C. P. & L. 1st pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
K. C. Power Sec. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
Lancaster Ry. pf. 1/2	Q	June 30	June 23
Do pf.	1/2	Q	June 30
Manila El. R. R. & L.	1/8	Q	July 1
Man. Bridge & L.	1/8	Q	June 30
Mass. River Power pf. 1/2	Q	Aug. 1	July 20
Mt. El. Ry. pf. 1/2	Q	Aug. 1	July 20
Monon. L. & P. pf. 1/2	Q	Aug. 1	July 20
New Eng. Inv. & S. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 20
Newport News & H. R.	1/8	Q	July 1
Do pf.	1/8	Q	July 1
Nor. Ohio Tr. & L. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
Ottawa Traction	1/8	Q	July 1
Philadelphia Co.	1/8	Q	July 1
Phila. & Western pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 30
Portland Ry. & L.	1/8	Q	July 1
1st pf.	1/8	Q	July 1
Porto Rico Ry.	1/8	Q	July 1
Do pf.	1/8	Q	July 1
Public Service N. J.	1/8	Q	June 30
Public Service N. J. pf. 1/2	Q	June 30	June 22
Putnam Sound P. & L. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
Reading Traction	1/8	Q	July 1
Ridge Av. Phila.	1/8	Q	July 1
Rutland Ry. & L. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
Springfield R. & L. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
Tri-City Ry. & L. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
Twin City R. T. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
Utah P. & L. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
Union Pass. Ry. Phila.	1/8	Q	July 1
Union Trac. & P. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 9
United L. & R. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
United Gas & E. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
Wash. & Ann. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
Do pf.	1/2	Q	July 1
W. End St. pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 15
West India Elec.	1/8	Q	July 1
West Penn. Power pf. 1/2	Q	Aug. 1	July 21
West Philadelphia	1/8	Q	July 1
Wisconsin Edison	1/8	Q	July 1
Yadkin River Power pf. 1/2	Q	July 1	June 17
York Ry. pf. 1/2	Q	July 30	July 20

## BANK STOCKS

America	3	Q	July 1	June 21
Atlantic Nat.	2 1/2	Q	July 1	June 25
Battery Nat.	3	Q	July 1	June 25
Battery Park Nat.	3	Q	July 1	June 25
Bronx Nat.	3	Q	July 1	June 15
Bryant Park	3	Q	July 1	June 21
Butcher & Drov. Nat.	300	Q	June 21	June 21
Central Mercantile	4	Q	June 20	June 20
Central Nat.	4	Q	June 20	June 20
Chase Nat.	4	Q	June 20	June 20
Chase Sec.	4	Q	June 20	June 20
Chatham & Phenix Nat.	4	Q	June 20	June 20
Chemical Nat.	4	Q	June 20	June 20
Colonial	4	Q	June 20	June 20
Columbia	4	Q	June 20	June 20
Coal & Iron Nat.	3	Q	July 1	June 8
Commonwealth	3	Q	July 1	June 17
Coney Island	4	Q	July 1	June 25
East River Nat.	4	Q	July 1	June 25
Fifth Av.	6	Q	July 1	June 30
Fifth Nat.	30	Q	July 1	June 30
Fifth Nat.	2	Q	June 30	June 20
Garfield Nat.	3	Q	June 30	June 30
First National	10	Q	June 30	June 30
Gotham Nat.	3	Q	June 25	June 25
Greenpoint Nat.	3	Q	June 21	June 21
Greenpoint Nat.	2	Q	June 21	June 21
Greenwich	3	Q	June 20	June 20
Homestead (Brooklyn)	3	Q	June 21	June 21
Hudson Nat.	3	Q	June 21	June 21
Imp. & Traders Nat.	12	Q	June 21	June 21
Irving Nat.	3	Q	June 21	June 21
Manhattan	3	Q	June 21	June 21
Mechanics & Traders	3	Q	June 21	June 21
Mechanics, Brooklyn	2	Q	June 18	June 18
Metropolitan	2 1/2	Q	June 23	June 23
Mutual	5	Q	June 24	June 24
Nassau Nat. Bklyn.	4	Q	June 24	June 24
National City	4	Q	June 24	June 24
National City	4	Q	June 24	June 24
New Netherlands	2	Q	June 24	June 24
N. E. County National	1 1/2	Q	June 25	June 25
New York	5	Q	June 20	June 20
North Side, Brooklyn	3	Q	June 8	June 8
Park National	3	Q	June 1	June 1
People's Nat. Bklyn.	4	Q	June 1	June 1
Public National	3	Q	June 30	June 30
Seaboard National	3	Q	June 24	June 24
Standard	3	Q	June 20	June 20
Standard	1 1/2	Q	June 30	June 30
Washington	6	Q	June 30	June 30
Yorkville	6	Q	June 30	June 30
State	6	Q	June 15	June 15
United States	2 1/2	Q	June 1	June 28

## TRUST COMPANIES

Bankers	5	Q	July 1	June 24
Brooklyn	5	Q	July 1	June 22
Central Union	5	Q	June 30	June 21
Columbia	4	Q	June 30	June 21
Columbia	4	Q	June 30	June 21
Corporation	2 1/2	Q	June 30	June 30
Empire	3	Q	June 25	June 25
Equitable	4	Q	June 25	June 25
Fidelity-Int.	2 1/2	Q	June 30	June 25
Guaranty	5	Q	June 30	June 17
Italian Disc. & Tr.	5	Q	June 1	June 1
Palton	5	Q	June 1	June 20
Hudson	2 1/2	Q	June 30	June 21
Lawyers Title & Tr.	1 1/2	Q	June 1	June 15
Manufacturers, Bklyn.	3	Q	June 1	June 20
Mechanics	2	Q	June 1	June 20
Metropolitan	2	Q	June 30	June 17
N. Y. Life Ins. & Tr.	12 1/2	Q	June 10	June 7
New York	5	Q	June 30	June 18
Peoples (Brooklyn)	4	Q	June 30	June 20
Title Guar. & Trust	3	Q	June 30	June 22
U. S. Mtg. & Tr.	6	Q	June 30	June 25
U. S. Mtg. & Tr.	50	Q	June 30	June 25
United States	25	Q	June 1	June 18
United States	10	Q	June 1	June 18

## FIRE INSURANCE

Continental	82.50	Q	July 8	June 27
Fidelity-Phenix	15	Q	July 8	June 27

## INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

Adirondack P. & L. pf.	1%	Q	July 1	June 18
Air Reduction	1/8	Q	July 15	*June 30
All America Cables	1%	Q	July 14	June 30
Am. Bank Note	1/8	Q	Aug. 15	*Aug. 1
Am. Brake Shoe & Fdy.	1/8	Q	June 30	*June 24
Do pf.	1%	Q	June 30	*June 24
Am. Gas & Electric	2 1/2%	Q	July 1	June 24

## ADVERTISEMENTS

## ADVERTISEMENTS

## Open Security Market

## RAILROADS

Green Star S. S. 7th, 1924	40	A. F. Ingold & Co., 74 Broadway. Rector 3993.
Do 7th, 1921-1924	30	A. F. Ingold & Co., 74 Broadway. Rector 3993.
Mo., Kan. & Okla. 5th, 1942	60	Wolff & Stanley, 72 Trinity Place. Rector 2920.
N. Y., N. H. & H. 4th, 1922	43 1/2	Maxwell B. Smith, 16 Exchange Pl. B. G. 4097.
Rio Grande Junction 5th, 1933	70	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St. Broad 4379.
San Pedro, Los Ang. & S. L. 4th	65	J. A. Hogle & Co., 169 Main St., Salt Lake City, Utah.
1961	69	Wolff & Stanley, 72 Trinity Place. Rector 2920.
Wilkes-Barre & Eastern 5th, 1942	45 1/2	Spencer Trask & Co., 25 Broad St. Broad 3500.
Wisconsin Central ref. 4th, 1939	55	

## INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

Advance Tumbly 6th, 1925	83	Hausher & Mackay, 15 Broad St. Hanover 4434.
Do scrip	85	Hausher & Mackay, 15 Broad St. Hanover 4434.
American Thread 6th, 1928	94	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
R. R. & R. Knight 1st 7th, 1930	88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Bell Tel. of Canada 5th, 1925	80	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Can. Car & Foundry 6th, 1929	78 1/2	A. F. Ingold & Co., 74 Broadway. Rector 3991.
C. n. Car & Foundry 1st 6th, 1929	79	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Can. Coal Co. 1st ref. 5th, 50	78	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Dominion Coal 1st 5th, 1940	78	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Ed. Dorado Refining 7th, 1924	90	A. F. Ingold & Co., 74 Broadway. Rector 3991.
Fleischmann 8th, 1930	100 1/2	W. E. Hutton & Co., 60 Broadway. Bowling Green 4140.
Federal Sugar Ref. 5th, 1924	94	Farr & Co., 133 Front St. John 6425.
Francisco Sugar 6th, 1939	82	Farr & Co., 133 Front St. John 6425.
International Silver Co. 1st 6th, 29	84	J. Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway. Bowling Green 6840.
Lackawanna 1st & S. Co. 1st 5th, 29	84	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ref. 4th, 2004	47	Wolff & Stanley, 72 Trinity Place. Rector 2920.
Nova Scotia Steel & Coal 1st 5th, 30	62	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Nat. Conduit & Cable 6th, 1927	58	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
O'Grady Coal 5th, 1922	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Peabody Coal 5th, 1922	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Shafter Oil & Ref. Co. 1st 6th, 29	70	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Sen Sen Chieft 6th, 1929	70	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Sherwin-Williams Co. 1st and	83	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
refunding 6th, 1941	87	
Utah Idaho Sugar 7th, 1930	84	J. A. Hogle & Co., 169 Main St., Salt Lake City, Utah.
U. S. Light & Heat 5th, 1935	80	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Utah Fuel 5th, 1931	81	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Webster Coal & Coke 1st 5th, 42	83	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway. Rector 813.
Valley Mould & Iron 6th	92	Pittsford & Hart, 170 Broadway. Cort. 6900.
West India Sugar Fin. 7th, 29	80	Farr & Co., 133 Front St. John 6425.

## Notes

## Notes

## PUBLIC UTILITIES

Empire G. & E. Co. 6th notes, '24	77	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St. Hanover 10000.
Do 8th notes, 1924	90	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St. Hanover 10000.

## INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

Anglo-Amer. Oil Co., Ltd., 7th	97 1/2	Curtis & Sanger, 49 Wall St. Hanover 6144.
Armour & Co. 6th, April 15, 1924	97 1/2	Curtis & Sanger, 49 Wall St. Hanover 6144.
Balt. & Ohio 6th, April 1, 1924	91 1/2	Curtis & Sanger, 49 Wall St. Hanover 6144.
Cons. Gas & Elec. Lt. & Fr. of	97 1/2	Curtis & Sanger, 49 Wall St. Hanover 6144.
Balt. 5th, Nov. 15, 1921	98	
Cons. Gas Co. of N. Y. 8th, Dec.	100	Curtis & Sanger, 49 Wall St. Hanover 6144.
1, 1921	100 1/2	
H. O. & R. Co. 7th, Mar. 1, 1923	95	Curtis & Sanger, 49 Wall St. Hanover 6144.
L. & M. Tob. Co. 6th, Dec. 1, 1921	99 1/2	Curtis & Sanger, 49 Wall St. Hanover 6144.
R. J. Reynolds Tob. Co. 6th, Aug.	95	Curtis & Sanger, 49 Wall St. Hanover 6144.
1, 1922	95 1/2	
S. P. U. N. D. 5th, Dec. 15, 1923	95 1/2	Curtis & Sanger, 49 Wall St. Hanover 6144.
Texas Co. 7th March 1, 1925	95	Curtis & Sanger, 49 Wall St. Hanover 6144.

## Stocks

## Stocks

## BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES

Bankers Trust Co.	185	Parker & Co., 49 Wall St. Hanover 110.
Battery Park Nat'l Bank	153	Parker & Co., 49 Wall St. Hanover 110.
Equitable Trust Co.	207	Parker & Co., 49 Wall St. Hanover 110.
Corn Exchange	208	Parker & Co., 49 Wall St. Hanover 110.
Guaranty Trust Co.	234	Parker & Co., 49 Wall St. Hanover 110.
Hanover National Bank	780	Parker & Co., 49 Wall St. Hanover 110.
Living National Bank	175	Parker & Co., 49 Wall St. Hanover 110.
Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bank	288	Parker & Co., 49 Wall St. Hanover 110.
National Bank of Commerce	205	Parker & Co., 49 Wall St. Hanover 110.
National City Bank	310	Parker & Co., 49 Wall St. Hanover 110.
National Park Bank	355	Parker & Co., 49 Wall St. Hanover 110.

## STANDARD OIL SECURITIES

Anglo-Am. Oil, Ltd.	15	15%	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
The Atlantic Refining Co.	800	850	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Do pf.	103	167	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Chesapeake Mfg. Co.	330	350	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
The Buckeye Pipe Line	71	73	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Chesbrough Mfg. Co.	145	155	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Continental Oil Co.	100	105	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
The Crescent Pipe Line Co.	28	28	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Comberland Pipe Line Co.	107	128	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
The Eastern Pipe Line	76	80	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Galea Signal Oil Co. pf., new	88	92	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Do pf., old.	88	92	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Do common.	32	35	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Illinois Pipe Line	148	153	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Indiana Pipe Line	125	127	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
International Nat. Co., Ltd.	22	23	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
National Transit	22	23	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
New York Transit Co.	110	120	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Northern Pipe Line Co.	85	90	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
The Ohio Oil Co.	238	243	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Penn.-Mer. Fuel Oil	30	35	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Pacific Oil & Gas	300	400	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Pacific Pipe Line	160	161	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
The Solar Refining Co.	340	360	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Southern Pipe Line Co.	75	80	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
South Penn. Oil Co.	148	155	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Southwest Penn. Pipe Line	34	35	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Standard Oil of Ind. (\$25 par)	40	47%	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Standard Oil of Ind. (\$25 par)	62%	62%	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Standard Oil of Kansas.	330	350	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Standard Oil of Kentucky.	375	390	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Standard Oil of Nebraska.	130	140	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Standard Oil of New York.	230	292	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Standard Oil of Ohio.	230	330	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Standard Oil of Ohio, pf.	130	151	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Swan & Finch Co.	25	35	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Union Tank Car Co.	90	95	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Do pf.	90	97	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Vacuum Oil Co.	240	250	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108
Vacuum Petroleum Oil	28	32	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St.	Broad 7108



ADVERTISEMENTS. ADVERTISEMENTS.

---

*Open Security Market*

## INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS—Continued


National Casket	35	100	Moyse & Holmes, 20 Broad St.	Rector 2908.
Nat. Co. of N. J. pf. (200 shares)	5	5	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Nat'l Equitable Inv. units	210	230	Steelman & Birkins, 20 Broad St.	Rector 4126.
Do pf. (20 shares)	210	230	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
New England Fuel Oil	17	17	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
New Jersey Zinc	117	120	Williamson & Squire, 25 Broad St.	Broad 6790.
New York Oil	15	12	Steelman & Birkins, 20 Broad St.	Rector 4126.
Naige Detroit Motor Co. 7% pf.	48	52	Fitzgerald & Harte, 170 Broadway.	Cortlandt 6900.
Niles-Pennett	48	48	Walton & Co., 105 Broadway.	Cort. 5885.
Noma Motor Corp. com.	5	5	Walton & Co., 105 Broadway.	Cort. 5885.
Do pf.	5	5	Melhuish & Co., 41 Wall St.	Hanover 8264.
North Am. Asbestos Corp. com.	10	10	Kohler, Bremer & Co., 32 Broadway.	Broad 6910.
Old Dominion (Houston)	58	62	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Packard Motor Car Co. pf.	28	62	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Prints-Piedmont	35	62	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Parent Motors (100 shares)	87	92	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Penny (J. C.) Co. 7% pf.	97	92	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Peters Home Building units	95	105	Steelman & Birkins, 20 Broad St.	Rector 4126.
Phelps-Dodge	145	155	Fitzgerald & Harte, 170 Broadway.	Cortlandt 6900.
Prints-Piedmont	35	62	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Procter & Gamble com.	98	100	W. E. Hutton & Co., 60 Broadway.	Bowling Green 4140.
Do 6% pf.	94	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 6% pf.	94	98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do 8% pf.	127	137	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Quincy Oats 6% pf.	61	70	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
Rauch & Lang units	80	70	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Do	60	70	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
Republic Acceptance	11	13	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Do	11	13	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Remington Phonograph	4	6	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Do	4	6	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
Do	4	6	Steelman & Birkins, 20 Broad St.	Rector 4126.
Do common	25	50	Steelman & Birkins, 20 Broad St.	Rector 4126.
Republ. Motor Truck Co.	50	60	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Standard Cap. & Sec. com.	67	74	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Do pf.	67	74	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Stevens-Duryea units	45	53	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
Do	45	54	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Do	47	52	Steelman & Birkins, 20 Broad St.	Rector 4126.
L. R. Steel units	85	95	Kohler, Bremer & Co., 32 Broadway.	Broad 6910.
Do (10 shares)	106	106	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
L. R. Steel Corp. & Sec. com.	37	40	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Do pf.	37	40	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
L. R. Steel Co. pf.	35	40	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
Do common	2	5	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
L. R. Steel Realty & Dev. com.	4	7	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Smith Rubber & Tire	50	80	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
Steelcraft units	48	58	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
Do	50	60	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Steinmetz Elec. Motors pf. (with 200% common)	95	125	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Struthers Wells com.	22	27	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Do pf.	25	85	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Templar Motors	25	45	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
Templeton	17	19	Kohler, Bremer & Co., 32 Broadway.	Broad 6910.
United Auto Stores com.	17	19	Steelman & Birkins, 20 Broad St.	Rector 4126.
Do common	45	50	Steelman & Birkins, 20 Broad St.	Rector 4126.
Do pf.	17	19	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
Do common	47	64	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
Do common	17	21	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Do pf.	17	21	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
United States Automotive	82	92	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
Do	83	93	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Union	65	65	Melhuish & Co., 41 Wall St.	Hanover 8264.
U. S. Cl. Strip, Min. 7%	65	65	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
U. S. C. S. Co. com.	75	80	Moyse & Holmes, 20 Broad St.	Rector 2908.
U. S. Finishing pf.	1.80	2.05	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
U. S. Metal Cap. & Seal.	1.80	2.10	Kohler, Bremer & Co., 32 Broadway.	Broad 6910.
Do	1.80	2.10	Steelman & Birkins, 20 Broad St.	Rector 4126.
Do	1	2	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Pl.	Bowling Green 3230.
Urban Motion Pictures com. (50 shares)	3	5	R. A. Solch, 16 Exchange Place.	Bowling Green 3230.
U. S. Worsted Co. 1st 7% pf.	16	21	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Van Raalte Co. Inc., 1st 7% pf.	78	82	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Welch Grape Juice Co. 7% pf.	80	85	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Willcoy Corp.	13	15	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Valley Mould & Iron com.	17	23	Fitzgerald & Harte, 170 Broadway.	Cort. 6900.
Do pf.	65	72	Fitzgerald & Harte, 170 Broadway.	Cort. 6900.
White Deer Min. Water Co. 6% pf.	45	45	Melhuish & Co., 41 Wall St.	Hanover 8264.
Western Collieries Coal.	13	16	Melhuish & Co., 41 Wall St.	Hanover 8264.
Willcoy Corp.	13	16	R. J. McClelland & Co., 100 Broadway.	Rector 0604.
Wilcox (H. F.) Oil & Gas.	1.25	1.75	Steelman & Birkins, 20 Broad St.	Rector 4126.
Winchester Co. 7% pf.	60	70	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Winthrop Mills 7% pf.	90	95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway.	Rector 813.
Wire Wheel Corp.	20	30	Steelman & Birkins, 20 Broad St.	Rector 4126.
Cleveland & Pitts 7% pf.	60	62	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St.	Broad 4377.
Do	60	62	Spencer Trask & Co., 25 Broad St.	Broad 2500.
Hudson & Manhattan com.	10	13	Wolff & Stanley, 72 Trinity Place.	Rector 2920.
Do	10	13	Wolff & Stanley, 72 Trinity Place.	Rector 2920.
Do Companies pf.	2	5	Wolff & Stanley, 72 Trinity Place.	Rector 2920.
Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. S. M.	53	55	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St.	Broad 4377.
Leased Line	84	84	Spencer Trask & Co., 25 Broad St.	Broad 2500.
St. Louis Bridge 1st pf.	84	84	Spencer Trask & Co., 25 Broad St.	Broad 2500.
Carrara	19	24	Farr & Co., 133 Front St.	John 6428.
Central Agulre	48	49	Farr & Co., 133 Front St.	John 6428.
Fajardo	60	61	Farr & Co., 133 Front St.	John 6428.
Federal Sugar Ref. com.	92	94	Farr & Co., 133 Front St.	John 6428.
National Sugar Ref.	97	103	Farr & Co., 133 Front St.	John 6428.
Savannah Sugar Ref.	14	22	Farr & Co., 133 Front St.	John 6428.
Do pf.	39	45	Farr & Co., 133 Front St.	John 6428.
West India Sugar pf.	70	78	Farr & Co., 133 Front St.	John 6428.
Hawkins Mortgage Co.	47	50	Cheninatt Bond & Inv. Co., 433 Main St.	Cincinnati, O.
United States Mortgage units.	170	185	Steelman & Birkins, 20 Broad St.	Rector 4126.
Cleveland Nat. Fire Insurance.	8	10	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Place.	Bowling Gr. 3230.
New Jersey Fire Insurance.	22	24	R. A. Solch & Co., 16 Exchange Place.	Bowling Gr. 3230.
Bristol & Bauer, 120 Broadway			Rector 4584	
American Tobacco scrip.	100	102	MacAndrews & Forbes pf.	Bid 92
American Cigar common.	78	83	MacAndrews & Forbes common	78 83
British American Tobacco	12	12 1/2	Do do American	68 65
Geo. W. Helme common.	150	160	Do pf.	98 100
Do pf.	150	160	Tobacco Products scrip. 5/8	92 95
Imperial Tobacco	87	91 1/2	Weymouth-Bruton com.	150 160
MacAndrews & Forbes common	87	92	Do pf.	150 160
Company.			Pe- Rate, riod.	Pay- Books
Underwood Typewriter.	2 1/2	Q	Oct. 1	1 Sep. 3
United Cigar Stores.	1 1/2	Q	July 25	1 June 15
United Drug	2	Q	July 1	1 June 15
United Drug 1st pf. 87 1/2	Q	Q	Aug. 1	1 July 15
United Drywood pf. 1 1/2	Q	Q	July 30	1 June 15
United Fruit	1 1/2	Q	July 1	1 June 15
Universal Leaf Tob. pf. 2	Q	Q	July 1	1 June 15
Utah Copper	30c	Q	July 30	1 June 30
U. S. Ind. Alcohol pf. 1 1/2	Q	Q	July 15	1 June 30
United Drywood	1 1/2	Q	July 27	1 July 22
Westinghouse Air B. 1 1/2	Q	Q	July 15	1 June 30
West Coast Oil.	1 1/2	Q	July 5	1 June 30
Westinghouse E. & M. 1 1/2	Q	Q	July 30	1 June 30
Do pf.	1 1/2	Q	July 15	1 June 30
West. Electric	1 1/2	Q	July 22	1 June 22
Western Union Tel.	1 1/2	Q	July 15	1 June 25
Wilson & Co. pf.	1 1/2	Q	July 1	1 June 25
Weymouth-Bruton	2 1/2	Q	July 1	1 June 13
Youngstown Sheet	50c	Q	July 1	1 June 13
Do pf.	1 1/2	Q	July 1	1 June 20
Holders of record; books do not close.				

## Dividends Declared, Awaiting Payment

Company.	Pe- Rate, riod.	Pay- able.	Books Close.
Pure Oil 6% pf.	1 1/2	Q July 1	June 15
Quaker Oats pf.	1 1/2	Q Aug. 31	Aug. 1
Safety Car H. & L.	1 1/2	Q July 1	June 15
Shawinigan W. & P.	1 1/2	Q July 1	June 22
Spicer Mfg. Co.	2	Q July 1	June 10
So. Porto Rico Sug. pf.	2	Q July 1	June 18
Standard Screw	3	— July 1	June 18
Do pf.	3	— July 1	June 18
Steel Tub. pf.	1 1/2	Q July 15	June 15
Symington (T. H.) Co.	50c	Q July 15	June 15
Do pf.	2	Q July 1	June 15
Texas Co.	75c	Q June 30	June 17
Tide Water Oil.	2	Q June 30	June 23
Transue-Williams	81	Q July 15	June 23
Tucker Tobacco	1 1/2	Q July 15	June 30
Do pf.	1 1/2	Q July 15	June 30



# The Annalist Barometer and Business Index Line



No change in earlier forecasts is indicated by the May Business Index Number. This has risen to 294, with the average price for stocks in May ranging between a high of \$9.9 and a low of \$5.29. No alteration in the forecasts already given can be indicated until the index line ceases to rise and turns downward. Meantime, therefore, the indications which were made apparent last November must be considered as still holding true. These were that the long bear market which had existed throughout 1920 and the latter part of 1919 would terminate in November or December and that a rally would occur in January, and that this would be followed by a relapse at the conclusion of which security prices would commence an upward movement presumably of long termination. To the extent that it has enabled these forecasts to be judged by facts they have been correct. The bear market did terminate in December, a rally occurred in January and the relapse which as yet seems not to have run its course did begin in the latter part of February. No time was fixed for the termination of this relapse and there is nothing in the index line to enable such a time to be determined. The only indication which may be given now is that at the conclusion of the present depression security prices should start on a long-continued upward rise.

As for business, no indication is apparent now to alter the forecast made last November that business activity would not begin to revive until August.

AT the moment the business situation presents rather a sombre picture. The dullness which has been upon industry ever since the first of the year, with only minor rallies, has been rather accentuated of late because of the period of Summer quietude which even in normal times acts as a brake on production. The favorable factors are still present, such as the easing of money, the thawing out of frozen credit and the general betterment in the banking situation throughout the entire country. But the favorable factors tend to be overshadowed by the unfavorable elements entering into the situation. The decline in security prices, for instance, has had a particularly disturbing effect, not because of any direct bearing which the decline itself has on general conditions, but rather because the sight of such a decline, as has taken place in the last three weeks, is unsettling to confidence. In conjunction with the stock market decline the last week has seen declines in commodity prices as well, cotton dropping off sharply and the Chicago grain market has been less buoyant. Then, too, foreign exchanges have been receding, and all in all the portrayal has not been of a kind to make for optimism. Rumors of impending trouble, vague in themselves, have been criss-crossing the banking and industrial situation, and while such reports are, in the main, either exaggerated or entirely baseless, still they cannot be other than disturbing.

This week will see the railroads placed in the position of receiving the benefits to be derived under the rulings of the Railroad Labor Board relative to the abrogation of national agreements and wage cuts. Judging from the stock market action of the railroad shares it might almost be expected that unfavorable, rather than favorable, news bearing on the railroad situation was about to develop. It is true that the steps which have already been taken will be no panacea for the carriers, but at least the elements are constructive, and the indications point to a favorable solution of the entire railroad problem. The saving to the railroads in wage cuts alone will be in the neighborhood of \$300,000,000 a year, no small item when it is remembered that the carriers as a whole may not earn fixed charges in 1921. The wage saving, of course, will apply to only one-half of the calendar year, but there is every reason to suppose that with this saving in effect the railroads during the final six months will contribute to a far better report than the first six months, even though the total earnings for the second half of the year fall short of the 6 per cent return as provided for in the Transportation act.

The stock market during the week just past was a sorry spectacle, even though there was some firming up of prices during the closing days. Apparently the stock market has been engaged in the process of discounting the past, and it would appear that the pendulum had swung too far, since the reaction has

sent the quotations of many seasoned issues far below their intrinsic worth.

During the week the Bank of England announced a reduction in its rediscount rate from 6½ to 6 per cent., this following on the heels of a reduction from 7 to 6½ per cent. a short time ago. This puts the Bank of England rate in line with that at New York. The reduction in the rate at London has apparently been discounted in that market. For some time the open market rate at London has been based on the prospect of a lower rediscount rate.

In the foreign exchange markets a further recession in sterling was apparently linked up with more selling by Germany to establish dollar credits. This has proved a costly operation for the Allies, and it therefore occasioned no surprise when the Reparations Commission announced that future payments by Germany could be made in any currency.

## Stocks

FURTHER sharp declines in security prices were in evidence last week. Many of the issues listed on the New York Stock Exchange went to new low levels for the year, some of them to the lowest level that has obtained in many years. During the early part of the week liquidation was heavy, this apparently coming in part from those accounts which were able to weather the steady decline which began in November of 1919 and has been in progress, except for limited intervals, ever since. This liquidation may or may not have been of really forced character, but whatever the reason, it caused marked recessions in prices. With United States Steel close to 70, and other seasoned industrials touching similar low prices; with Canadian Pacific at the lowest in twenty years and our own rails under pressure the stock market was a decidedly cheerless affair. With the further passing of dividends, rumors of trouble on every hand and specific adverse factors bearing on certain groups of stocks the market looked far from healthy.

In the main the market is still influenced by the professional element, and the success which has attended their efforts is indicated by the liquidation of long stock. How much of a short interest exists at the present time is a matter of speculation. There is no way of gauging the situation. Normally it might be expected that on the outflow of long stock the professionals on the short side would begin to cover. This would be the course of procedure to make certain of profits, and if practice has been followed now the short interest may not be of anything like the scope that some people believe.

When the market rallied, or at least firmed up, in the latter days of last week sentiment immediately improved, as is always the case under such circumstances. But after a decline such as that which has taken place the rally could hardly be called buoyant, and this lack of rebound might indicate the depletion of the short interest.

Either this is the case or else the short interest is so confident of its position that it cannot be scared into covering by any moderate firming up in prices. On the whole, however, it would seem that prices had been depressed to a point where efforts toward further contraction through professional activities would fail. There must be a point beyond which prices will not go on the downward side.

That bargains exist in many cases is indicated by the increase in odd lot buying last week. This represented public participation in a moderate degree and was of an investment rather than a speculative character. Normally it may be expected that the market has turned when odd lot buying grows to sizable proportions. However, so many are the factors entering into the situation that rules fail in their application at the present time.

It is probable that the market will be called upon to face further cuts in dividends such as have been a particularly disturbing factor of late. But certainly, in the light of the price recessions which have taken place, there will probably be a greater resistance shown than in the past.

## Bonds

IN the midst of a week of weakness and descending values the one bright spot of the securities market was the initial action taken by the Secretary of the Treasury in asking Congress for authority to proceed with the business of refunding the amounts owed us by foreign nations on account of the war. It is expected that hearings on this petition will begin next Wednesday and a detailed view of the machinery by which this work is to be accomplished will undoubtedly be afforded. The staggering burden of 10,141,000,000 has become altogether too great a one for the Treasury to bear and it must now be spread over the broad financial structure of this country and carried by the people. It is hoped that the conferences which the Secretary has held for some weeks previous will give him a comprehensive view of the present sagging market and cause the financing to be of the character that will appeal to the great mass of people and not clutter and cripple the general investment market through inactivity.

It is absolutely vital that industrial and utility capital requirements be provided for and that in the event of the present depression ending there will be a sufficient margin of capital available to meet the demands made by new business.

The bond market is actuated more often from without than within because capital, timid and very shy, always looks around and sizes up the chances for fair weather before it goes out for a stroll. Distant and small clouds are as effective as threatening masses because of the potentialities they have of developing. Into many industries money could be put with great chances of profits, but seemingly for investors the "streets of Paris are running with blood." The oil industry as a whole needs financing, not so much for capital development, but because of the opportunity to buy the fuel itself and store for a return of the market to normal rates. One very large unit with tremendous equities of acreage in proven ground has no way of raising money on other than fact or equipment, perhaps the least valuable of all its assets. The markets have fallen away so sadly in respect to even the old line sterling issues that no one wants to lend money on anything that can't be taken into the home or put away

for safe keeping in the barn if something goes wrong. Salesmen make very little headway in face of the adverse winds of deferred or part dividends, lack of orders and a labor situation still up in the air. The foreign Government list is looked at askance and the credit of an entire nation is rated as dubious and subject to revolution and Soviets.

The City of Bordeaux 6 per cents. are selling at 78, or the same price as a Louisville & Nashville unified 4 per cent. The French Government 8 per cents. haven't touched par for nearly a month and this past week have been off nearly a point. The one strong and consistent position holder is the Swiss Government 5 per cent., which improved during the week and sold up to 104½. The Brazilian 8 per cents. sold on a fairly level basis and the State of San Paulo 8 per cents. were about 94½. The United Kingdom list was rather weak with the 5½ per cents. of 1957 at 83½ and the 5½ per cents. of 1929 at 89½. The Mexican Externos gold 5 per cents. were back to their normal level at 44, as were the Chinese Railway 5 per cents. The flurry which centered about the Mexican bonds upon the report that the Government would resume interest payments on July 1 has quite subsided, as bankers, in view of the negligible balances carried in this country, believe Mexico will be some little time yet before meeting these obligations.

The railroad section was quite inactive and there was little interest displayed in any particular quarter. The recent action of the directorates of the two Hill lines in declaring dividends on faith rather than from an earnings basis seemed cold comfort for stockholders and in less measure for the bondholders of roads with less extensive surpluses. If these roads had earned their dividends it would have been more encouraging, as now the question is asked: "If these roads cannot get by, where do the others get off?"

The Pennsylvania issues were pretty well sustained, the gold 7 per cents. getting a slightly increased premium and the 6½ per cents. showing strength at 96½. The Atchafalaya general 4 per cents. were slightly stronger and the adjustment 4 per cents. were slightly off. The second grade rails as an average were from one to fractional points weaker. The San Francisco list was weaker, as were the Seaboard Air Line issues.

The industrial market showed a wider variation of influences. The United States Rubber 5 per cents. were weak at 75½, while the Sinclair 7½ per cents. were strong at 91½ and under some pressure.

The Pan-American Petroleum equipment 7 per cents. were quoted at 88 and the Virginia-Carolina debenture 5 per cents. were at 83. The International Mercantile Marine 6 per cents. were about 70, which puts them in a class with the City of Bordeaux 6 per cents.

The Public Utilities were very quiet and seemingly moved only to lose ground. The Montana Power 5 per cents. were off about two points and the Public Service of New Jersey 5 per cents. were also lower. The American Telephone and Telegraph collateral 4 per cents. lost fractionally, while the collateral 6 per cents. were constant at 97½.

On the whole the week's market was very disappointing and its static condition was most discouraging to both buyers and investment houses.

## Foreign Exchange

AFTER the exciting and more or less violent fluctuations which characterized foreign exchanges as the first reparations settlements were made by Germany, the exchanges have settled into a midsummer lethargy which is but fitfully roused now and then by rather feeble bursts of speculation. Such idleness as has marked the exchange market this week is the usual midsummer condition. In view of the worldwide slump in business it is hardly to be expected that the exchange market will progress at the rapid rate which characterized it, say three or four months ago.

The principal exchanges have moved within a very restricted arc. There was little more than a 5-cent fluctuation in the pound sterling during the entire week. France followed a similar course. Sterling recorded its high mark of \$3.79½ on Monday and gradually eased away until a low of \$3.72½ was reached on Friday. France followed sterling with a high of 8.23 on Monday and a low of 7.97 on Friday. Exchange on Rome sold at 5.07½ on Monday and declined gradually to 4.75. The same course was followed by Holland, Berlin and Madrid.

Foreign exchange dealers were inclined to the view that London is out of the market as far as selling developments. The decline in the Bank of England discount rate following a similar decline in the Federal Reserve Bank rates would under ordinary circumstances be expected to produce an exhilarating effect on the exchange market, particularly as regards sterling. The fact that this favorable development passed virtually unnoticed by the exchanges created a great deal of comment on this side of the water.

With the exception of occasional bursts of advances or declines propelled by speculation here and abroad, it is anticipated that the foreign exchanges will remain comparatively inactive until definite announcement comes from the Reparations Commission as to the method Germany shall pursue in meeting her second installment of the war obligation. It now appears certain that the Reparations Commission will not again permit the wholesale accumulation of dollars in New York by sales of exchanges abroad.

This method, followed in the first payment, was judged by the commission to be that which would cause least disturbance to the exchanges. The actual transfer did not bear out this prophecy. Dollars, under pressure of accumulation abroad, commanded an abnormal premium. The commission now has ruled that any other currency may be used in making the next payment. The outcome of this ruling and the methods to be adopted by Germany will be awaited by the financial world—and particularly by the foreign exchange markets—with more than usual interest. Pending the knowledge of details of the next payment, the exchanges are very likely to reflect the attitude adopted by all countries standing aloof from the market, leaving it largely to the mercies of the in and out speculator on both sides of the water, whose operations rarely are of sufficient volume or importance to carry the market far either way.

## Money

THE avalanche of funds which have flowed to Wall Street during the last month has produced a condition in which distinct easiness is the predominating characteristic. Idle money released by the slow thawing of frozen credits, the funds ordinarily used at this time for the purchase of heavy supplies of raw materials, and funds awaiting employment in moving the crops this Fall have backed up in financial centres to an amazing degree. The plethora of idle funds has provided a midsummer surprise for bankers and others interested in the money markets, for it had been the general belief that after the June 15 Government settlements a recurring period of stringency might be anticipated. However, this has not proved to be the case, and as a matter of fact the bankers had been hard put in the last week or so to find active employment for idle funds. This has been reflected not alone in one department of the money market, but in practically all of them. Call money, for instance, has ruled at 5 per cent. on the New York Stock Exchange this week. One must go as far back as Oct. 27, 1919, to find a similar incident. The rate of 5 per cent. ruling on the Stock Exchange is, to be sure, a nominal figure. Several millions of dollars were lent in the "outside market" during the week at 4 per cent. One instance is on record where a house was able to secure half a million dollars at the surprising figure of 3 per cent. In the time money department identical condition obtained. The rate now is 6 to 6½ per cent., depending upon maturity. A feature of the time money market which has not escaped unnoticed in the financial district is the fact that differential between mixed and all industrial collateral has entirely disappeared as funds pressed on the market. Commercial paper likewise reflected the easier tone, and during the latter part of the week prices in this department, too, were shaded.

Prior to this week the bulk of the acceptances have borne the names of country banks. However, with call money ruling on the Stock Exchange at 5 per cent., and with several million dollars going unlent each night, the New York banks have turned, to some extent at least, to the acceptance market as a field for active and remunerative employment of idle funds. Competition between the two in this market, therefore, has been rather keen.

In the opinion of a number of bankers the period of tight money has been definitely passed. Of course vast funds will be required to move the heavy crops, and a call money rate of 5 per cent. and a time money rate of 6½ per cent. cannot be considered permanent in these abnormal times. However, the money situation appears to be well in hand; each new day sees a further thawing of credit, and with the expected revival of industry this Fall bankers see ahead a period in which 6 per cent. will be the normal rate and in which ample funds at that figure will be available for all needs.

## Textiles

THE closing days of June always find the textile markets very dull from a sales point of view, and the only difference this year is that trading—save on strictly seasonable merchandise wanted for immediate delivery—is less active than usual. Last week's activities, or lack of them, were no exception to the rule. Even price-cutting on the part of certain members of the jobbing trade, in order to stimulate retail buying, failed to do more than upset the plans of some of the mills' selling agencies.

The hot weather was responsible for a marked improvement in the consumer—and also the retail—demand for wash goods, white goods and other sheer dress cottons, but, coming so late in the season, the call for them did not get back as far as the mills. In other words, it did not stimulate the demand for the goods in the gray or unfinished state. The more staple gray goods had a quiet week of it, with second hands again in the market as sellers. As usual when this is the case, prices eased off to some extent. Heavy colored cottons were dull and listless.

In the woollens and worsteds end of the textile trades the week was largely given over to speculation regarding when prices would be made for the Spring, 1922, season, and also what the new figures would show, if anything, in the way of reductions. It is thought that if any reductions are made at all, they cannot exceed a 10 per cent. decline from those now current, this margin representing the difference in production costs between lightweight and heavyweight woollens. As against the possibility of such a decline is the duty that has been placed on imports of raw wool, and the possibility is not altogether missing that quotations on some "numbers" in the new Spring lines may be relatively higher than the prices now asked for Fall goods. As for the opening of the new Spring season, it appears now that the biggest factor in the trade will not price goods much before Aug. 1, while other concerns may trail in as late as September.

The high prices reached by raw silks in the primary markets has caused buyers, who have filled their requirements more or less for the next month or two, to stop purchasing for the time being. As yet, however, this has not caused any recession of values, and in the Chinese markets, in particular, the high silver exchange has kept prices very steady. So far as business in finished silks is concerned, there has been no real change beyond a further falling off in demand for seasonable stuff.

In the burlaps market another quiet week was put in, but prices were at least sentimentally firm, in spite of the dullness. Interest here at the moment centres in a report from Calcutta that two of the largest producers there may increase their working schedules from four days a week to five days at the end of next month. If this is done it will make for a larger production, and may ultimately bring about an easing off in prices.

Linens importers, in an endeavor to stir up business, have been pointing out of late how much below the normal price—pre-war—prices of the present year have been. They make the point, and it probably is true, that retail distributors of linens have made few plans for Fall, and they assert that this situation must be changed very soon if the public is to be served. In the meantime business continues to drag.



## Shipping

ANOTHER rate war has developed. The conference lines in the Levant trade have agreed upon a slashing reduction in the rates on the principal commodities, moving from the United States to Piræus, Patras, Saloniki, Constantinople, Alexandria and Smyrna. On some commodities the carrying charge was halved. There is a dual object in the marked reduction. The conference members hope to bring into line two companies which have hitherto refused to abide by conference tariffs by cutting rates until heavy operating losses will be incurred by the non-members, forcing them to come in the mutual arrangement. The steamship companies seek to make it impossible for the Japanese lines which have been diverting steamers on the India run to the Levantine ports to continue this practice.

Three large British interests—the Cunard Line, Furness, Withy & Co. and Norton, Lilly & Co.—are in the conference, while the Shipping Board is represented by a number of operators—the United American Lines, Oriental Navigation Corporation, Export Transportation Corporation, Moore & McCormack, and the Export Steamship Company—on this route. The new tariff will continue in effect throughout July, but it is possible that it will be withdrawn before that time.

The continuance of the British coal miners' strike has led to the placing of large orders for fuel to be shipped to United Kingdom ports, with a resultant boom in the charter market. More than eighty steamers were fixed during the past week for the movement of coal to British ports, and nearly sixty ships were of American registry. The charter rates ranged around \$5.50 with free discharge at the opening of the week, but the demand for spot ships grew so strong that prompt vessels were chartered as high as \$6.75 during the latter part.

The charter rates to French Atlantic, Scandinavian, Belgian, Dutch and Italian ports strengthened and were advanced as much as

30 cents per ton by virtue of this spurt. With the settling of the miners' strike, there will be a marked falling off in the demand for ships, although it will be necessary for foreign consumers to replenish their stores with American coal for several weeks after the mines resume work.

While the newspapers have devoted scarce heads to stories of missing vessels and the suggestion has been made that their vanishing may be due to the activities of pirates, the marine insurance market has not reflected this apprehension. The Department of Commerce is endeavoring to solve the mystery surrounding the loss of the crew of the sailing ship Carroll A. Deering.

The new Shipping Board has made a rather favorable impression with the ship-owners, but thus far has taken no action of any real significance. The general policies have been outlined in such a sketchy fashion that it could not be safely predicted what course Chairman Lasker will pursue. He has held several conferences with the most representative men in American shipping and has given assurance that the board will consult with the practical, experienced men before formulating its policies and taking action of grave importance. The new Chairman is now devoting most of his attention to the preliminary step of selecting the men who will be in charge of the most important branches of the Shipping Board.

The Royal Netherlands West India mail has announced that it will resume the passenger services out of New York to Caracas and Venezuela with the sailing of the Nickerie in August. Four steamers, with accommodations for about seventy cabin passengers, will be placed on the route in conjunction with two freight steamers, offering a fortnightly service. The vessels have a speed of about eleven knots and range in size from 2,000 to 3,000 gross tons. The Dutch flag has been in the West Indies for a great number of years.

With the sailing of the America for Cherbourg and Bremerhaven on June 26, the United States Mail Steamship Company

inaugurated its transatlantic express service. The George Washington will follow late in July, while the President Grant is expected to be placed in service early next Fall. More than \$2,000,000 has been spent to recondition the America and the George Washington for the commercial service, after having been employed as army transporters. The Centennial State, the first of the 522-foot Shipping Board liners to be outfitted with stateroom accommodations, is scheduled to clear for London on June 28.

The largest ship ever built in a French shipyard arrived here on June 22, when the Paris of the French line docked. With accommodations for more than 3,000 passengers, the steamer, an oil-burner capable of making a speed of twenty-two knots, will ply between New York and Havre, J. Dal Piaz, President of the Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, upon arriving here on the Paris, declared the passage of the emergency immigration bill would discourage foreign lines from constructing more steamers of large tonnage.

There are definite indications that the grain rate, which is the basis of all tariff construction, will be raised about July 1. The United Kingdom conference early in June slashed its rates from 7 to 5 shillings per quarter. The reduction has met with such widespread objection in other trades which were sympathetically affected that the steamship lines expect a return to the former level.

Trade relations with Russia are being resumed in a way. Contracts have been placed with American coal exporters, through British firms, for 50,000 tons of coal to be shipped from Atlantic ports to Petrograd and other Soviet destinations.

The International Mercantile Marine Company has announced the purchase of the new ex-German steamer Columbus from the Reparations Commission. The steamer will be operated by the White Star Line from Southampton and New York, entering the service in the Fall.

The Shipping Board has announced that a non-partisan board of arbitration will be

appointed to pass upon claims of shipbuilders and other creditors of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, having claims amounting to \$300,000,000.

## Iron and Steel

THE past week has brought forth little in the way of encouragement so far as the iron and steel industry is concerned. To be sure, there has been some picking up here and there in the way of forward business, but orders are not of any substantial character. However, that buying which is coming into the market represents actual demand, and this is a good sign. Still, there is no immediate prospect of a growth in orders such as will permit the steel companies to undertake manufacture on a higher scale. As a matter of fact, there is nothing to indicate any great degree of improvement for a number of months to come. Blast furnaces and steel works were operating last week slightly below the level of the preceding week. Some of the larger companies have less than one-quarter of their blast furnaces in operation and many of the smaller companies are shut down completely.

It seems to be clear that one of the chief troubles of the industry is the price schedule. To be sure, business is at low ebb throughout the country and this would make for stagnation no matter what may be the quotations on steel, but there undoubtedly is a fair proportion of business which would be available to the manufacturing companies if the price level were to drop still further. Steel men are reluctant at this time to make any reduction in prices for the reason that to do so would necessarily mean that wages would have to be reduced, and any such under-taking carries with it a certain degree of danger because of the dissatisfaction that may be created in the minds of the workers. But an endeavor to uphold the price of iron and steel products, it seems, must fail, since the trend of all commodities is toward lower quotations.

## Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets

## Boston

Sales	High	Low	Last	Net
127 Ahmeek .....	48	47	47	-1 1/2
190 Alaska G. M. ....	32	32	32	+1/2
290 Am. Zinc .....	74	74	74	0
50 Am. Zinc pf. ....	24 1/2	24 1/2	24 1/2	0
150 Anacosta .....	37 1/2	35	35	-3 1/2
510 Arcadian Con. ....	2	2	2	0
440 Arizona Con. ....	8	7 1/2	7 1/2	-1/2
5 Bingham .....	0	0	0	0
825 Calumet & Hecla ..	47	45 1/2	46	-1 1/2
53 Calumet & Hecla ..	235	226	226 1/2	-1/2
60 Centennial .....	7 1/2	7	7	-1/2
735 Carson Hill .....	12 1/2	11 1/2	12 1/2	0
25 Chino Copper .....	21 1/2	20 1/2	20 1/2	-1/2
55 Copper Range .....	33	32	32	-1/2
1,100 Davis-Daly .....	6 1/2	5 1/2	5 1/2	-1/2
1,198 East Butte .....	8 1/2	7 1/2	8	-1/2
165 Franklin .....	2	2	2	0
10 Granby Cons. ....	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
1,300 Helvetic .....	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	0
5 Hancock .....	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	0
670 Island Creek .....	66	63 1/2	64 1/2	-1 1/2
35 Insp. Copper .....	31 1/2	31 1/2	31 1/2	0
10 Isle Royale .....	10 1/2	10 1/2	10 1/2	0
50 Kerr Lake .....	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	0
90 Keweenaw .....	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
45 Lake Copper .....	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	0
40 Mass. Con. ....	2	2	2	0
1,085 Mayflower Old Col.	19 1/2	19 1/2	19 1/2	0
5 Miami .....	10 1/2	10 1/2	10 1/2	0
192 Mohawk .....	48 1/2	47	47 1/2	-1
627 New Cornelia .....	14 1/2	14	14 1/2	0
46 New River pf. ....	85	83	83	-2 1/2
80 Nipissing .....	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	0
2,335 North Butte .....	8 1/2	8 1/2	8 1/2	0
10 Osceola .....	26	25	26	-1
30 Pond Creek .....	13 1/2	13	13	-1/2
60 Quincy .....	37	36 1/2	36 1/2	-1/2
150 Seneca Cop. ....	14 1/2	14	14	-1/2
40 Shannon .....	30	30	30	0
500 South Utah .....	05	05	05	0
1,675 Superior & Boston ..	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
1,800 Tootell .....	60	50	60	+10
10 U. S. Smelting .....	29	29	29	0
524 U. S. Smelting pf. ....	40 1/2	39 1/2	39 1/2	-1/2
1,182 Utah Apex .....	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	0
230 Utah Cons. ....	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
905 Utah Copper .....	47 1/2	47	47	-1/2

## Stocks—Averages—Bonds

## TWENTY-FIVE RAILROADS

June 20	High	Low	Last	Net
June 21	49.84	47.71	47.93	-2.03
June 22	49.38	47.39	48.99	+1.60
June 23	50.24	49.10	49.19	-1.05
June 24	49.19	48.24	48.54	-.65
June 25	49.33	48.48	49.19	+.65
June 26	50.71	49.68	50.37	+1.38

## TWENTY-FIVE INDUSTRIALS

June 20	High	Low	Last	Net
June 21	71.91	69.20	69.81	-2.06
June 22	72.06	69.12	71.21	-1.40
June 23	73.41	70.32	70.99	-2.22
June 24	71.56	69.18	70.27	-1.11
June 25	71.70	69.38	71.45	+1.18
June 26	74.13	71.89	73.94	+2.40

## COMBINED AVERAGE—50 STOCKS

June 20	High	Low	Last	Net
June 21	60.87	58.45	58.87	-2.04
June 22	60.72	58.35	60.10	-1.23
June 23	61.82	59.81	60.09	-.91
June 24	60.37	58.71	59.49	-.89
June 25	60.53	58.92	60.32	-.92
June 26	62.42	60.78	62.25	+1.93

## BONDS—FORTY ISSUES

June 20	High	Low	Last	Net
June 21	67.56	67.56	67.56	0
June 22	67.56	67.56	67.56	0
June 23	67.56	67.56	67.56	0
June 24	67.56	67.56	67.56	0
June 25	67.56	67.56	67.56	0

## Stocks—Yearly Highs and Lows—Bonds

Year	High	Low	High	Low
1921	75.13	58.35	71.69	67.56
1920	94.07	62.70	75.14	67.56
1919	96.50	60.73	79.03	71.05
1918	80.16	64.12	82.38	75.65
1917	90.46	57.43	88.48	74.24
1916	101.51	80.91	89.48	86.19
1915	94.13	58.90	87.62	81.51
1914	73.30	57.41	82.42	81.51
1913	79.10	63.09	92.31	85.45
1912	82.83	75.24	92.31	85.45
1911	84.41	66.57	92.31	85.45

Sales	High	Low	Last	Net
50 Victoria .....	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
100 Winona .....	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
100 Wolverine .....	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
30 Wyandotte .....	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0

Sales	High	Low	Last	Net
382 Boston & Albany ..	120	119	119	-2
708 Boston Elevated ..	62	62 1/2	62 1/2	0
4 Boston Elev. pf. ....	82	82	82	0
164 Boston & Maine ..	19	15 1/2	18 1/2	+2 1/2
7 Boston & Maine pf. ..	21	11 1/2	11 1/2	-9 1/2
21 Boston & Prov. ....	112	110	112	0
2 Chi. Junction .....	130	130	130	0
17 Maine Central .....	39	39	39	0
1,572 N. Y. N. H. & H. ..	134	144	144	+3 1/2
111 Old Colony .....	61 1/2	58	58	-3 1/2
10 Rutland pf. ....	27	17	17	-10
190 West End .....	41 1/2	40 1/2	41	-1
54 West End pf. ....	51	49	50	-1

Sales	High	Low	Last	Net
43 Am. Ag. Ch. pf. ....	65	61	63	+2 1/2
355 Am. Pn. Serv. ....	11	11	11	0
1,040 Am. Sugar .....	71 1/2	67 1/2	71 1/2	+4 1/2
368 Am. Sugar pf. ....	90 1/2	87 1/2	90 1/2	+1 1/2
3,008 Am. T. & T. ....	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	0
115 Am. Wool .....	62 1/2	62 1/2	62 1/2	0
42 Am. Wool pf. ....	93 1/2	93 1/2	93 1/2	0
142 Amoskeag .....	86	86	86	0
73 Amoskeag pf. ....	78	78	78	0
30 Atlas Tack .....	16	16	16	0
100 Atl. Gulf .....	22	22	22 1/2	+1/2
100 Baco. Chocolate ..	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	0
50 Barnsdall B. ....	16	15	16	-2
353 Century Steel .....	20	20	20	0
10 East Boston Land ..	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	0
235 Eastern S. S. ....	14	14	14	0
30 Eastern S. S. pf. ....	23	22 1/2	23	+1/2
73 Edison Electric .....	157	156	156	-1
25 Elder Mfg. ....	8	8	8	0
60 Gardner Motor .....	10 1/2	10 1/2	10 1/2	0
96 General Electric .....	122 1/2	122 1/2	122 1/2	0
455 Gray & Davis .....	10 1/2	10 1/2	10 1/2	0
195 Greenfield T. & D. ..	26	25	26	-1
503 Int. Cement .....	22 1/2	21 1/2	21 1/2	-1
4 Int. Cot. Mills .....	75	73	73	-2
10 Int. Cot. Mills pf. ....	80 1/2	80 1/2	80 1/2	0
280 Int. Products .....	4	4	4	0
795 Island Oil .....	3	2 1/2	3	+1/2
186 J. T. Connor .....	12	11 1/2	12	+1/2
1,530 Libby, McIn. & Co. ..	12 1/2	12 1/2	12 1/2	0
167 Loew's Theatres .....	16	14	14	-2
399 Mass. Gas .....	75	73	75	-2
288 Mass. Gas pf. ....	61 1/2	60 1/2	60 1/2	-1 1/2
1,897 McElwain pf. ....	75	73	73	-2
110 Merg. Indus. ....	118	119	119	0
1,055 Mex. Inv. ....	29 1/2	29 1/2	29 1/2	0
119 Miss. Riv. & W. pf. ....	60	60	60	0
1,725 National Leather ..	7	6 1/2	6 1/2	-1/2
137 New Eng. Tel. ....	10 1/2	10 1/2	10 1/2	0
10 Ohio Bond .....	8 1/2	8 1/2	8 1/2	0
157 Orpheum Circuit .....	21 1/2	21 1/2	21 1/2	0
136 Pacific Mills .....	160	160	160	0
33 Pullman .....	93	92 1/2	92 1/2	-1/2
95 P. A. Sugar .....	28	28	28	0
100 Revere Folding .....	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	0
445 Simms Magneto .....	6 1/2	6	6	-1/2
100 Southern Phosphate ..	12 1/2	12 1/2	12 1/2	0
865 Swift & Co. ....	91 1/2	89 1/2	89 1/2	-2
164 Swift Interstate .....	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	0
45 Torrington .....	48	47	47	-1
49 United Drug .....	87	85 1/2	85 1/2	-1 1/2
190 United Drug 1st pf. ....	40	37 1/2	38	-2
70 United Trust Dr. ....	10 1/2	10 1/2	10 1/2	0
1,276 United Trust Dr. ....	10 1/2	10 1/2	10 1/2	0
834 United Shoe M. ....	34 1/2	33 1/2	34 1/2	+1/2

Sales	High	Low	Last	Net
253 United Shoe M. pf. ....	24 1/2	23	24	+1 1/2
2,550 Ventura Oil .....	17 1/2	16 1/2	17	+1 1/2
1,180 Waldorf .....	15 1/2	15 1/2	15 1/2	0
200 Walworth .....	11	10 1/2	11	+1/2
150 Waltham Watch .....	10 1/2	10	10	-1/2
141 Waltham pf. ....	61	58	58	-3
100 Warren Bros. ....	15	15	15	0
52 War. Bros. 1st pf. ....	21	20	21	+1
120 War. Bros. 2d pf. ....	20	20	20	0

3,008 Am. T. & T.	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	102 $\frac{3}{4}$	-	$\frac{1}{4}$
115 Am. Wool.	68 $\frac{3}{4}$	65 $\frac{1}{2}$	66 $\frac{1}{4}$	-	$\frac{1}{4}$
82 Am. Wool pf.	95	93 $\frac{1}{2}$	95	+	1 $\frac{1}{4}$
142 Amoskeag	89	86	86	-	3 $\frac{1}{2}$
73 Amoskeag pf.	78	78	78	..	..
30 Atlas Tack.	16	16	16	-	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
100 Atl. Gulf & W. I.	22	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{4}$	+	$\frac{3}{4}$



ADVERTISEMENT.

ADVERTISEMENT.

## Keep our Ships on the Seven Seas under the Stars and Stripes



### TO ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD

#### AMERICAN SHIPS ARE AVAILABLE FOR YOUR OCEAN VOYAGE.

New Combination Passenger and Freight Ships—Fast, Luxurious Steamers,

#### THE STANDARD OF THE MARINE WORLD

#### Latest Passenger Sailings

##### New York to Europe via Bremen and Danzig.

6—Antigone.

Return New York via Danzig, July 16th.

##### New York to Europe via Boulogne and London.

6—Panhandle State, June 28th.

Return to New York via London and Boulogne, July 14th.

##### New York to Europe via Bremen and Danzig.

6—Susquehanna, July 5th.

Return New York via Danzig, July 24th; via Bremen, July 29th.

##### New York to Europe via Boulogne and London.

6—Old North State, July 12th.

Return New York via London and Boulogne, July 28th.

##### New York to Europe via Boulogne and London.

6—Panhandle State, August 2nd.

Return New York via London and Boulogne, August 18th.

##### New York to Europe via Boulogne and London.

6—Old North State, August 16th.

Return New York via London and Boulogne, September 1st.

##### New York to Europe via Bremen and Danzig.

6—Susquehanna, August 18th.

Return New York via Danzig, September 6th; via Bremen, September 10th.

##### New York to Europe via Boulogne and London.

6—Panhandle State, September 6th.

Return to New York via London and Boulogne, September 22nd.

##### New York to Europe via Boulogne and London.

6—Old North State, September 20th.

Return New York via London and Boulogne, October 6th.

##### New York to Italy via Naples and Genoa.

6—Pocahontas, June 30th.

Return New York via Genoa, July 21st; via Naples, July 23rd.

##### New York to Italy via Naples and Genoa.

6—Princess Matoika, July 14th.

Return New York via Genoa, August 4th; via Naples, August 6th.

##### New York to Italy via Naples and Genoa.

6—Pocahontas, August 11th.

Return New York via Genoa, September 1st; via Naples, September 3rd.

##### New York to Italy via Naples and Genoa.

6—Princess Matoika, August 25th.

Return New York via Genoa, September 15th; via Naples, September 17th.

##### New York to Italy via Naples and Genoa.

6—Pocahontas, September 22nd.

Return New York via Genoa, October 13th; via Naples, October 15th.

Key number before ship's name indicates name and address of steamship company in the following list:

#### Operators of Passenger Services

- 1 Admiral Line,  
17 State St., New York City
- 2 Matson Navigation Co.,  
120 Market St., San Francisco  
26 S. Gay St., Baltimore, Md.
- 3 Munson Steam Ship Line,  
82 Beaver St., New York City

- 4 New York & Porto Rico S. S. Co.,  
11 Broadway, New York City
- 5 Pacific Mail S. S. Co.,  
7 Hanover Square, New York City  
621 Market St., San Francisco, Calif.

- 6 U. S. Mail S. S. Co.,  
45 Broadway, New York City
- 7 Ward Line,  
(New York and Cuba Mail S. S. Co.)  
Foot of Wall St., New York City

#### American Freight Ships to All Parts of the World.

#### SERVICES

##### Europe

- 1 Aberdeen, Leith, Dundee
- 2 Antwerp, Ghent, Hamburg, Rotterdam
- 3 Barcelona, Genoa, Naples, Venice
- 4 Belfast, Dublin
- 5 Bilbao, Oporto, Lisbon
- 6 Black Sea Ports
- 7 Bordeaux, Ghent
- 8 Bremen, Antwerp
- 9 Danzig
- 10 Bremen, Hamburg
- 11 Bristol, Manchester
- 12 Christiania, Copenhagen
- 13 Constantinople, Varna, Bourgas, Constantza and other Black Sea Ports
- 14 Copenhagen, Gothenburg, Stockholm, Reval
- 15 Cork, Dublin, Belfast
- 16 Dunkirk, Rotterdam
- 17 French Atlantic Ports
- 18 Genoa, Naples, Savona
- 19 Gibraltar, Tunis
- 20 Glasgow, Avonmouth
- 21 Gothenburg, Marmora
- 22 Greek, Turkish Ports
- 23 Havre, St. Nazaire
- 24 Hull
- 25 Lisbon, Oporto, Vigo
- 26 Liverpool
- 27 Avonmouth
- 28 Bristol
- 29 Boulogne
- 30 London, Liverpool
- 31 Manchester
- 32 Piraeus, Patras, Salonica
- 33 Ragusa, Venice, Bari, Ancona
- 34 Rotterdam, Antwerp
- 35 Scandinavian Ports
- 36 Scandinavian and Baltic
- 37 Spain, Portugal

##### South America

- 38 Bahia, Rio de Janeiro
- 39 Brazil and Plate
- 40 Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Pernambuco, Santos
- 41 Chili-Iquique, Antofagasta
- 42 Ecuador, Peru, Chili
- 43 West Coast

##### Cuba and Mexico

- 45 Kingston, Matanzas, Nuevitas, Cardenas
- 46 North Side
- 47 South Side
- 48 Tampico, Mexico

##### Islands of Atlantic, West Indies and Caribbean Sea

- 49 Jamaica, Haiti
- 50 Sanchez de Macoris, Santo Domingo, D. R.
- 51 Pointe a Pitre
- 52 Porto Rico
- 53 San Juan, Ponce
- 54 Trinidad, Demerara

##### China, Japan, Philippines and Straits Settlements

- 55 Manila, Hilo
- 56 Yokohama, Kobe, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Dairen, Tientsin
- 57 New Zealand and Australian Ports

##### India and Dutch East Indies

- 58 Alexandria, Aden
- 59 Rangoon, Calcutta, Bombay
- 60 Karachi, Colombo
- 61 Penang, Belawan, Delhi, Port Swettenham, Singapore

##### Africa

- 62 Canary Islands
- 63 North Africa, Malta, Egypt, Levant, Red Sea Ports, Madeira, Morocco
- 64 South and East Africa
- 65 West Coast

FOR SAILINGS OF FREIGHT SHIPS TO ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD WRITE DIVISION OF OPERATIONS, TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT, U. S. SHIPPING BOARD EMERGENCY FLEET CORPORATION, WASHINGTON, D. C.



